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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ERIC P. SWENSON, 
Appellantf 
v. 
LYLE R. ANDERSON, 
Appellee. ; 
Case No. 20020227-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
a. Issues. 
1. Whether imposing sanctions and awarding fees for counsel,s 
taking of a previous appeal amounted to an improper use of Ut. R. 
Civ. P.f Rule 11 (Addendum, Exhibit 4). 
2. Whether the district court erred in finding counsel to be 
in violation of Rale 11(b)(1). 
3. Whether the district court erred in finding counsel to be 
in violation of Rule 11(b)(2). 
4. Whether the district court erred in finding counsel to be 
in violation of Rule 11(b)(3). 
All of these issues were preserved below. R. 1899-1968. 
b. Standard of Review. 
Utah appellate courts use a three-standard approach in 
reviewing a trial court's Rule 11 findings: (1) reviewing the trial 
court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard; (2) 
reviewing the trial court's ultimate conclusion that Rule 11 was 
violated and any subsidiary legal conclusions under the correction 
of error standard; and (3) reviewing the trial court's 
determinations as to the type and amount of sanction to be imposed 
under the abuse of discretion standard* Bernard v. Sutliff, 846 
P.2d 1229, 1233-1235 (Utah 1992). 
The Court's determination that Rule 11 was violated was based 
on the case record and its construction and interpretation of that 
record is ultimately a question of law that must be reviewed 
without giving any deference to the trial court. Morse v. Packer, 
973 P.2d 422, 424-425, f 12 (Utah 1999). 
The foregoing standards apply to all issues on appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Rule 11 (Addendum, Exhibit 4) is a determinative authority in 
this case. There is no determinative authority other than Rule 11, 
although reference to civil rules, statutes and case law will 
assist the Court in determining this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action pursuant to the federal civil rights act, 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, et seg., concerning the exclusion of Native 
Americans from the jury selection process in the Seventh District 
2 
Court for San Juan County. Enforcement proceedings were brought in 
1997 because the Utah Judicial Council (hereafter, Council) was out 
of compliance with a consent decree. An appeal was taken regarding 
three matters. One involved the liability of one Seventh District 
judge. A second question pertained to that judge's request for 
sanctions. A third involved plaintiff's request for attorneys fees 
from the Council. The questions of fees and sanctions were 
remanded to the district court. On remandf the district court 
ordered plaintiff's counsel to be sanctioned and awarded attorneys 
fees to the district court judge. Plaintiff's request for fees was 
denied. An appeal is taken only from the award of sanctions. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Pursuant to an Agreement of Parties (Addendum, Exhibit 1, R. 
648-657) (hereafter, Agreement), an Order and Decree (Consent 
Decree)f R. 678-679 (Addendum, Exhibit 2), was entered in 1996. 
The Agreement and Consent Decree resolved claims of racial 
discrimination and other violations by the Council regarding the 
exclusion of Native Americans from the jury list in the Seventh 
District Court for San Juan County, Utah. Id. at 648-649• 
In 1997
 f plaintiff initiated a contempt and enforcement action f^c£h#h>\S 
alleging that the Council and a Seventh District Judge, Honorable I 
Lyle R. Anderson, had violated the consent decree and/or aided and J 
abetted the Council in the violation of the Agreement and Consent I 
Decree. R. 684-725. 
On September 22, 1998, the trial court granted a motion to 
strike the allegations against Judge Anderson. R. 1185-1189. The 
3 
order followed a ruling from the Bench on August 14, 1998, R. 1600, 
Pages 3-8. The district court, the Honorable David Roth, denied 
the Judge's motion for Rule 11 sanctions. Id. Plaintiff filed an 
amended motion on October 13, 1998, R. 1256-1307, and proceeded to 
trial in December, 1998 on claims against the Council. 
Following trial, Judge Roth entered Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions Of Law And Judgment. R. 1555-1566. 
Plaintiff took an appeal from the order granting the Motion to 
Strike as well as from an order denying costs and attorneys fees. 
R. 1588-1589. A cross appeal was taken regarding the denial of 
Judge Anderson's Motion for Sanctions. This Court determined all 
pending issues on appeal. See Crank v. Utah Judicial Council, 20 
P.3d 307 (Utah 2001) (hereafter referred to as Crank I). 
This Court overturned the district court's ruling denying 
plaintiffs' requests for attorneys fees from the Judicial Council 
and remanded the question for further determination. Crank I, 20 
P.3d 307, 316-319, 11 38-43. This Court upheld Judge Roth's ruling 
denying sanctions under Rule 11(b)(1) by affirming the trial 
court's finding that counsel acted in good faith. Issues under 
Rules 11(b)(2)-(3) remanded for consideration by the district 
court. Crank I, at 20 P.3d 303, 316, H 33-34. 
C. DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT ON REMAND 
On remand, the district court denied plaintiff fees against 
the Council. R. 2057-2069 (Addendum, Exhibit 3, ruling). This 
issue is not on appeal. The district court also ruled that 
plaintiff's counsel must be sanctioned under Rule 11 and ciwarded 
4 
Judge Anderson partial attorneys fees. Id. at 2065-2069. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No factual findings regarding the alleged violations of Rule 
11(b) (1) - (3) were made based on new evidence. The only new 
evidence adduced on remand came in the form of affidavits 
pertaining to fees and costs. No evidentiary hearings were held. 
The district court awarded sanctions based solely on its 
construction and interpretation of the.1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Employing Rule 11 sanctions for counsel's taking the 
appeal in Crank I was an improper use of Rule 11. The appellate 
rules provide for sanctions for frivolous appeals and only this 
Court can impose such sanctions. This Court did not find that the 
appeal in Crank I was frivolous. The presumption that counsel's 
improper motive was substantiated by the taking of the first appeal 
violates the rule against irrebuttable presumptions and has no 
basis in the record. 
An award of attorneys fees was inappropriate. Sanctions in 
the form of attorneys fees were inappropriate because they were 
imposed as punishment and not as a deterrence, as required by Rule 
11(c)(2) . Awarding fees was particularly inappropriate where there 
were disputed issues of fact involving whether there should be fees 
1
 However, memoranda submitted by Judge Anderson attempted 
to supplement the factual record in the same way that it was 
attempted in Crank I. R. 1740-1819; see also Appellants Reply 
Brief. Crank I., Pages 1-4; 20-23. However, it is clear that the 
same record used by Judge Rothf and this Court in Crank I, is now) 
the only proper record which can be used to review the district) 
court's imposition of sanctions on remand. 
imposed, the amountf the hourly rate and other factors placed into 
issue by counsel's affidavit on remand* 
Fees should not be awarded for the first appeal because it 
operates to chill the right to appeal erroneous lower court 
decisions. Rule 11 should not be used as a weapon to intimidate 
lawyers who bring controversial lawsuits for poor and 
underprivileged clients. Counsel should be protected from this 
abuse of judicial power. This is especially important for the 
future rights of Native American jurors in San Juan County because 
the Council, with the assistance of Judge Anderson, is once again 
using jury lists which exclude Indian jurors. 
2. Sanctions are not appropriate under Rule 11(b)(1) because 
counsel had a proper purpose in bringing the action against Judge 
Anderson. The proper motive was to effectively respond to the 
improper exclusion of Native Americans from the jury selection 
process in San Juan County and to address the judge's role in that 
process. The district court, Judge Roth, and this Court in Crank 
I, upheld the finding that counsel had no improper purpose. This 
is the law of this case and to contradict these rulings is error, 
flki applying Rule 11(b)(1), the district court violated this Court's 
mandate on remand which required the district court to limit the 
issues to those in Rules 11(b)(2)-(3). Moreover, it was error for 
the district court to impose sanctions on the basis that an 
improper purpose was presumed from the taking of the first appeal 
in Crank I and that counsel's use of a ruling in a separate 
criminal case likewise presumes an improper purpose. 
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3. Counsel made a claim against Judge Anderson that he aided 
and abetted the Council's violation of the Consent Decree. A claim 
against a non-party for aiding and abetting a person or entity who 
is violating a court order is universally recognized by many 
jurisdictions* This is a viable claim presenting a plausible 
argument based on reasonable research that cannot be a basis for 
sanctions under Rule 11(b)(2), The elements of this claim are: 
a* A non-party acts in concert with and in privity with a 
party to a court order; 
b. The non-party has notice of the order. 
c. A party to the court order is violating the order. 
d. The non-party is aware that the party is violating the 
order. 
e. The non-party acts or fails to act with the purpose of 
aiding and abetting the party in its violation of the Order. 
Counsel's research into this area of the law amounted to a 
reasonable inquiry and, based on the record and the cases 
reflecting the law of other jurisdictions, was objectively 
reasonable. 
Counsel also made claims that the judge directly violated the 
Agreement in two respects, that using lists which improperly 
excluded Native Americans violated the Agreement, 1 4 and by 
violating f 8, which prohibits constitutional or statutory 
violations. These are plausible claims because there is also 
language from the Consent Agreement and Decree which arguably runs 
the force and effect of the injunction to non-parties who are 
7 
acting in concert with the Council. 
In addition, counsel made a good faith argument that 
application of the theory underlying the aiding and abetting claim 
against Judge Anderson found in cases in other jurisdictions should 
be extended to the law in Utah. It was objectively reasonable for 
counsel to rely on the plain meaning of the terms of the Agreement 
and Consent Decree. This Court in Crank I implicitly acknowledged 
the validity of counsel's legal theory using Utah statutory law. 
This means that plaintiff's legal theory comports with existing 
Utah law. Rule 11 is not a fee shifting statute and its use in the 
manner employed by the district court is contrary to the rule in 
civil rights cases that attorneys fees may not ordinarily be 
awarded to prevailing defendants. 
4. Rule 11(b)(3) cannot be a valid basis for imposing 
sanctions because counsel presented a proper factual basis in 
support of the legal claim, including verified pleadings, 
affidavits of witnesses and expert witnesses and a wealth of jury 
data and other facts about the jury selection process. The 
question of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the clciims was 
not made by Judge Anderson in the original motion, not addressed by 
plaintiff or counsel, and not considered or ruled upon by Judge 
Roth in his initial ruling finding sanctions were inappropriate. 
The issue was raised by Judge Anderson for the first time on 
appeal. Such a claim has been waived. 
Moreover, under Rule 11(c), counsel must be given notice of 
the claim and provided an opportunity to cure the alleged defect, 
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which was not done in this case* The process that concluded with 
counsel,s sanction violated this rule* This also raises serious 
due process concerns. In Crank I, this Court, while noting that 
the facts were insufficient, did not hold that there were no facts 
alleged at all, and did not intimate in any fashion that sanctions 
for inadequately alleged facts could be a proper basis for 
sanctions* There are numerous factual allegations in the record 
and there was a factual showing on plaintiff's most important 
theory underlying the aiding and abetting claim that was adequate 
to avoid sanctions. Moreover, there was confusing and 
contradictory dicta in Crank I that the district court adopted on 
remand as a basis sanctions about the factual allegations that was 
mixed with claims that plaintiff never made* 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
Imposing sanctions on counsel for taking the appeal 
in Crank I was an improper use or Rule 11* Awarding 
fees as punishment and not for deterrence was improper* 
Sanctions must not be used to chill the right of 
appeal and intimidate lawyers bringing public 
interest litigation* 
a* Sanctions for appeals should be reserved 
to the appellate courts* 
The district court imposed sanctions under Rule 11(b)(1) on 
the basis that counsel's taking of the first appeal in Crank I 
demonstrates improper purpose. R. 2068-2069. Employing sanctions 
for counsel's taking of the appeal and awarding appeal fees in 
Crank I was an improper use of Rule 11 by the district court. 
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corporation, 496 U.S. 384, 405-409 
9 
(1990); see also Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure. 
Civil 2d, § 1336. In Cooter, the Court said "[on] its face, Rule 
11 does not apply to appellate proceedings." Id. at 406,. The rule 
only applies to events occurring in the district court. Id. The 
Court said: 
Neither the language of Rule 11 nor the Advisory Committee 
Note suggests that the Rule could require payment for any 
activities outside the context of district court 
proceedings....We believe Rule 11 is more sensibly understood 
as permitting award only of those expenses directly caused by 
the filing, logically, those at the trial level." Id. 
The Court reasoned that the expenses related to the appeal are 
directly caused by the district court's sanctions and the appeal of 
the sanctions, not by the initial filing in the district court. Id. 
at 407. The Cooter Court's reasoning should be persuasive because 
it construes a rule similar to Utah's. See Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 
P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah courts look to federal case law to develop 
its interpretation of Rule 11). 
Rule 11 is not a proper basis for a district court to sanction 
conduct occurring on the appeal level because that function is 
expressly reserved to the appellate courts. Appellate courts can 
impose sanctions for frivolous appeals. See Rule 33, Ut. R. App. P; 
Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 34 P.3d 194, 207 n. 11, 1 38 (Utah 2001) 
(appeal fees denied by appellate court as proper exercise of 
court's discretion); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P«»2d 932, 
940-941 (Utah 1998) (sanctions imposed by district court under Rule 
11, fees for frivolous appeal imposed by Supreme Court under Rule 
33). In Cooter, the Court said: "The Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure place a natural limit on Rule 11's scope." Cooter & Gell 
10 
v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 407. The Court did not approve of 
the district court's award attorney fees to the appellee: 
...even when the appeal would not be sanctioned under the 
appellate rules. To avoid this somewhat anomalous result 
Rules 11 and 38 are better read together as allowing expenses 
incurred on appeal to be shifted onto appellants only when 
those expenses are caused by a frivolous appeal, and not 
merely because a Rule 11 sanction upheld on appeal can 
ultimately be traced to a baseless filing in the district 
court. Limiting Rule 11's scope in this manner accords with 
the policy of not discouraging meritorious appeals. Id. at 
407-408. 
A frivolous appeal is one that is "...not grounded in fact,-<|/\jU ^ ^ 
nor warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith **rA* 
argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law." Rule 33(b); ^te> 
,UA 
see also Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 970 P.2d 1256, 1272 V* i l l * &~ 
% v* 
4> 
(Utah 1998). In Crank I this Court did not find that the appeal
 {{fr\ 
was frivolous despite the request from Judge Anderson that the 
Court impose Rule 33 sanctions. See Judge Anderson's Appeal Brief, 
Crank I. Pages 28-30. The sanctions imposed on counsel are 
therefore improper because the district court used Rule 11 to 
circumvent the appellate process where this Court, at least 
implicitly, had rejected sanctions for the appeal. 
And finally, Appellant is mindful that this Court issued a 
mandate on remand for the district court to consider appeal fees, 
including the judge's fees. Crank I, 20 P.3d 307, 319, 44 & n. 17 
(citing Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998)). 
The Court did not consider the Cooter rule, a rule that may be 
especially appropriate in a case where the judiciary and the 
district court are the subject of the action. Thus, cases not 
applying Cooter's well-reasoned principles, such as Valcarce, 
11 
should no longer be the rule. 
b. Fees awarded as punishment conflicts with Rule 11's 
purpose of deterrence. 
An award of attorneys fees was inappropriate. Judge Roth 
determined that there would be no sanctions in this matter and 
specifically found that Attorney Swenson acted in good faith. See 
Point Two, infra. The Supreme Court upheld this finding« Crank I, 
20 P.2d 307, 316, H 32. This is significant because although 
improper purpose may amount to a violation of a subsection of Rule 
11 (Rule 11(b) (1)), improper purpose appears not be the controlling 
factor in determining the type of sanctions. Apparently 
recognizing this concept, the Supreme Court stated that awarding 
attorneys fees is not a mandatory sanction. Id. at 316, 1 22. 
Rather, Rule 11 states: "A sanction imposed for violation of 
this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter 
repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others 
similarly situated." Rule 11(c)(2). The rule further states that 
if the violation is raised on motion, attorneys fees can be* awarded 
as "...warranted for effective deterrence." Id. The trial court is 
not required to assess attorneys fees, but if it does it may do so 
"...only to the extent necessary 'to deter repetition of [the 
inappropriate] conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly 
situated.'Utah R. Civ. P. 11(C)(2) (2001)." Featherstone v. 
Schaerrer, 34 P.3d 194, 208, I 41. Thus, the main purpose of Rule 
11 is to deter not compensate. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & 
Procedure, Civil 2d, § 1336. Rule 11 cannot be used as a fee 
\j shifting statute. Id. 
12 
^ 
^ 
Deterrence was not the district court's basis for awarding 
fees. The district court's ruling emphasized counsel's motives 
throughout the opinion. E.g., R. 2067-2068. Counsel's alleged 
improper motivation, and particularly the improper purpose alleged 
to have been established by the taking of the first appeal, was the 
only basis for the district court's award of attorneys fees. R. 
2068-2069; see also R. 2068 (the purpose of the award is not to 
compensate but to impose sanctions). The sanctions were therefore 
punitive in nature. No other reason was given supporting the type 
of sanction that was imposed. 
The district court never specified that deterrence was the X0 \ V6 
basis for an award of attorneys fees. No findings were made at all 
regarding the deterrent effect of fees. Thus, the district court 
violated the rule's requirement that it "...explain the basis for] 
the sanction imposed." Rule 11(c)(3); see also Griffith v. 
Griffith, 985 P.2d 255, 258, I 10 (Utah 1999). This is 
particularly important for the proper administration of Rule 11. 
Id. The district court's authority to award fees is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. JDd. (citing Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 
1229, 1233-1235). In Crank, the district court failed to make any 
findings at all regarding deterrence as required by the rule. No 
evidence was presented on this issue. The fee award should 
therefore be set aside because Rule 11 was not applied properly. 
c. The district court failed to properly resolve 
disputed issues of fact. 
An award of attorneys fees was especially questionable in 
light of the disputed facts evident in the record that were not 
13 
resolved by the district court with an evidentiary hearing prior to 
imposing sanctions. By affidavit, counsel raised questions about 
the amount of fees claimed, the alleged hourly rate and other 
documentation presented in support of a high fee request. See 
Declaration of Attorney Eric P. Swenson, R. 1957-1963. Given this 
conflict in the facts, awarding fees without allowing discovery and 
a full evidentiary hearing was error. There should have been a 
full evidentiary hearing to make Judge Anderson's lawyers prove up 
the alleged basis for their fees and to clear the air about the 
whether they were being entirely candid with the Court about their 
hourly rate. This would have been in accordance with the district 
court's obligation to independently analyze the reasonableness of 
the requested fees. United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Durbano Constr. Co., 
144 F.R.D. 402, 409 (D. Utah 1992) (quoting White v. General Motors 
Corp., 977 F.2d 499, 501 (10th Cir. 1992)). 
d. Fees should not be awarded for the first appeal 
because it chill's the right of appeal of 
erroneous lower court decisions. It may also 
imperil the rights of Native American jurors by 
obstructing enforcement of the Consent Agreement. 
Fees should not be awarded for the first appeal because it 
operates to chill the right to appeal erroneous lower court 
decisions. Imposing sanctions in the form of fees as was done here 
for taking the first appeal is contrary to the rule that sanctions 
should only be reserved for the most egregious cases, "'lest there 
be an improper chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower 
court decisions.'" Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 931 (Utah App. 
1998) (quoting Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988) 
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and followed in Hudema v. Carpenter, 989 P.2d 491, 503 n. 14 (Utah 
App. 1999)). 
Allowing the district court to use Rule 11 to impose appellate 
fees operates to obstruct and intimidate litigants. This problem 
was addressed by the United States Supreme Court: 
Limiting Rule 11's scope in this manner accords with the 
policy of not discouraging meritorious appeals. If appellants 
were routinely compelled to shoulder the appellees' attorney's 
feesf valid challenges to district court decisions would be 
discouraged. The knowledge that, after an unsuccessful appeal 
of a Rule 11 sanction, the district court that originally 
imposed the sanction would also decide whether appellant 
should pay his opponent's attorney's fee would be likely to 
chill all but the bravest litigants from taking an appeal. See 
Webster v. Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032, 1040 (CA6 1988) ('Appeals 
of district court orders should not be deterred by threats [of 
Rule 11 sanctions] from district judges'). Moreover, 
including appellate attorneys fees in a Rule 11 sanction might 
have the undesirable effect of encouraging additional 
satellite litigation....It is possible that disallowing an 
award of appellate attorneys fees under Rule 11 would 
discourage litigants from defending the award on appeal when 
appellate expenses are likely to exceed the amount of the 
sanction. There is some doubt whether this proposition is 
empirically correct (citations omitted) as Rule 11 is not 
a fee shifting statute, the policies for allowing district 
courts to require the losing party to pay appellate, as well 
as district court attorneys fees, are not applicable. 'A 
movant under Rule 11 has no entitlement to fees or any other 
sanction, and the contrary view can only breed litigation 
(citation omitted).' Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 
U.S. 384, 408-409. 
The district court's ruling in Crank is out of step with the common 
sense view in Cooter that sanctions on the district court level 
under Rule 11 must not usurp a function reserved to the appellate 
courts. 
That decision-making employing only the benefit of hindsight 
can have undesirable effects on counsel is problem that had 
confronted the federal courts in reviewing fee applications in 
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civil rights case* How this problem has been dealt with may be 
instructive to this Court in the Rule 11 context. Awarding the 
attorneys fees to a prevailing defendant under the fee provision, 
42 U.S.C. § 1988, is extremely rare, even for theories that some 
may regard to be frivolous or pretty far out. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 
61 F.3d 1505, 1513-1517 (10th Cir. 1995). 
In Jane L, the Court said that a district court should avoid 
the "understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by 
concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, 
his action must be unreasonable or without foundation. This kind 
of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight 
claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate 
success." Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1513 (quoting 
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 421-422 
(1978)). Thus, no fees were awarded against counsel for making a 
claim in Jane L that Utah's abortion law violated the 
constitutional proscription against involuntary servitude because 
one judge and a preeminent legal scholar supported such a claim. 
Jane L, at 1514-1515. 
What the district court actually did in Crank conflicts with 
the reasoning in Jane L because it engaged in post hoc reasoning in 
using Rule 11 to award fees because one litigant prevailed and the 
other did not. This is not Utah's Rule 11 standard. Rule 11 is not 
a fee shifting statute, although the district court in Crank 
apparently used the rule in this fashion to make an award to a 
prevailing party under the guise of sanctions. This is improper. 
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A "1 ' ,rii iipy; "iiiiki1 plausible arguments based on case precedents and 
other legitimate source evertheles* ind 
themselves on the losing end of a count's decision. 1 
I : laced in dire straits hindsight logic 
became the standard imposing 
"ii civil rights cases, defendants often threaten sanctions 
ar? ulleinpl counsel. Rule operates more heavily 
against controversial lawsuits ana 
rprivileged clients Judges ai >articularly good 
position to manipulc iudicial process by engaging 
threatening conduct >i> •, ,:. shouia oe 
attorney is protected from the abuse of judicial power 
making legitimate I I i judiciary involved 
questionable activities involve issues of race. 
I i »II p inception rather than the usual rule. This principle is 
especially important lur Uie 111111114 • iif" i CPIIIPIII of the rights of 
Indian jurors in San Juan County now that the Council has announced 
tihi i1-, " , | , iolating the Consent Decree by using jury 
lists which unlawfully exclude Native Aim-i i •tu,",, f'.ei.' I! 2095-2098. 
2
 Studies have indicated that threats ot sanctions operate 
more heavily against civil rights litigants. Vairo, Rule 11i A 
Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D, ]89, 200-201 (1988); Rule 11 in 
Transition: The Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 69 (1989), cited in Burbank, The 
Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 
137 U. Pa. L Rev, 1925, 1938 (1989); Comments on Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rule, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. (1991) 
(Submitted to the Committee on Rules and Practice of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States). 
POINT TWO 
There is no basis for sanctions under Rule 11(b)(1). 
(a) Counsel's purpose is apparent from the record. 
The district court misconstrues this record. 
Its decision is therefore clearly erroneous. 
Rule 11(b)(1) is violated if an action is "...for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of the litigation." In his original 
motion for sanctions, Judge Anderson submitted no evidence 
establishing counsel's improper purpose, see. Motion, R. 1001-1029; 
Consolidated Reply, R. 1059-1079, other than providing materials 
relating to the Estrada case. Estrada has no bearing on the 
question of motive, as argued, infra. Thus, it is clear that an 
improper purpose, if any there be, can only be imputed to counsel 
from other portions of the record. 
Counsel's legitimate purpose is apparent from the record, 
particularly the lengthy pattern of discrimination against Native 
American jurors evident in San Juan County's jury selection 
history. An attorney whose purpose is to stop this discrimination 
is properly motivated. Properly addressing the exclusion of Native 
Americans from jury service has always been counsel's motive. The 
district court's presumption that the record reveals an improper 
motive, a motive supposedly confirmed by the taking of an appeal, 
is an inaccurate characterization of the record. This construction 
of the meaning of the record constitutes clear error. 
Counsel's purpose is proper and apparent from the record: 
Native Americans were grossly under represented on jury 
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at timesi indeed, for most of l.liis last century, 
American Indians were not prest'iM | milt,
 ti j \ i See R. 657 
(Exhibi - • o Agreement) (1932-1996); N\ I21>H Uti4 | I W Il| li . 
They improperly excluded in ?0ll,\ It. 1095-2098. 
- Although a Seventh Dislii'-i iitufi I system 
to be di scriminatory i.ii .197 4 and issued a writ uf habeas corpus 
a 'i i in II nl « ii , ... Smith, U 148,-~238a-240a, the exclusion 
of Native Americans continued. Crank Vhu> I i In iddress 
this continuing problem. 
riie i Hpr esonl.aLiiii 1 Utah's judiciary, the Utah 
Judicial Council, and the Seventh District Judges, 
antered into Consent Agreement with Crank , 
tcK. •, Consei injunction, 
seg. igreeing reforms which would grant wax: 
selection. Id.; see, e.g., I 652-654 (Agreement, 
5 4 Native American jur n r H nii " M s h status 
652 xt •! tri al court retained jurisdictioi 
c I I 11 Court's mandate (Agreement) 79 
(Consent Decree) , I i1.. backgrounc JLLL & motive 
for what he did, since with the filine ** * ue Consent Decree 
a ."ufil i Dili ii | I'i I i gat: ion to monitor » i enforce the Agreement on 
behalf of the class. See Duran v. JL*^-
1496 (10th Cir. 1989). 
] ii In,".!; I h.in ' 'ouncil broke i ts promise by 
creating jury lists which excluded Native of 
the Agreement. In order to implement the violation, a judge had to 
assist the Council by actually using the lists* Using the lists 
and thereby completing the jury selection process would effectively 
lock out those Native Americans who should have been on the lists. 
The person who performed this role was the Seventh District Judge 
who was operating and managing the jury selection system on the 
district court level, Judge Lyle R. Anderson. It was Judge 
Anderson's acts and omissions while engaged in this process that 
aided and abetted the Council in violating the court ordeir. There 
were facts supporting the judge's culpable role which were apparent 
to counsel. See Point Four, infra. Enforcement proceedings were 
required in order to make Utah's judiciary live up to its word. 
Contempt proceedings were also brought against the only district 
court judge who was using the deficient jury lists, operating and 
managing the jury selection system for the Council on the district 
court level, including qualifying and disqualifying individual 
jurors, assisting the Council in implementing and monitoring the 
jury system and its compliance with the Agreement, and, in 1997 and 
1998, implemented the Council's violation of the court order by 
aiding and abetting the Council's violations by using bad jury 
lists. Id. 
It was the use of the bad lists excluding Native Americans 
that was at the center of the controversy. If the lists had not 
been used, this action would not have occurred. There was an easy, 
quick and inexpensive method of revising the lists to bring them up 
to the required percentages of Native Americans. This process is 
known as supplemental sampling. Supplemental sampling is a 
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ematical procedure known i t:he Council and Judge Anderson 
which proportiona copulation f re r "i**-. census 
divisio; County iu« up wit a 
opulation • 1 «. county, 24 (Di 
Dennis Willigan Sixr !he Council had a 
staff employee who could have easily undertaken this procedure 
i' r J 111.11 iil-i 11 , " HIPI-MI
 (l plaintiff unsuccessfully tried volunteer 
his expert at no charge for this sampling was 
never used. Eventually, the Council hrough its attorney , 
admi oer and efficacious process, H. IfiOO, 
Pages 17-19. Despite the ready availabil I* uml ui.n 
fix, the lists,, which were documented to a mathematical certainly 
I o have excluded cant numbers of Native Americans, 
were used anyway. 
The district court based its decisior ?mpose sanctions on 
counsel s taking Judge Anderson claims. 
2067-2069. The sanctions were accordingly limited ' • • iii" ' 
t Imhi«. I i1/ « ii. appeal and post-appeal. 'There i ,s J 
perfectly good reason wli / ij.'i appea. dismissal of 
the Judge Anderson, claim while pursuing contempt chaj 
a Judicial Council. 
This Court commented ompelled the 
Council to now lake its obligations seriously: """"|xj,ti this case 
seems Crank's second suit has instilled i certain 
heightened degree of circumspectness *herenc * > 
the procedural details of the Agreement," Crank ~ - : [ 
38, 317, n.14. As was the case with the Councilf counsel's motive 
in regards to Judge Anderson was to make the judge take 
discrimination against Native American jurors seriously as well. 
It is evident from the record that the right of Native 
Americans to be on jury lists in certain numbers is something that 
Judge Anderson never took seriously• This prompted the action 
against him* The judge felt he could ignore the minimum standards 
for inclusion of Native Americans on jury lists by using lists that 
contained insufficient numbers of Indian jurors. 
The judge's use of the bad lists was documented in one 
criminal case in the Seventh District and provided an example of 
exactly how he aided and abetted the Council in the use of lists 
which improperly excluded Native Americans, State v. Estrada. 
There, Judge Anderson was apprised that the jury lists did not have 
the minimum numbers of Indian jurors required by the Agreement and 
should not be used. The lists excluded approximately 148-168 
Native Americans who were supposed to be on the lists in 1997, R. 
1260, and approximately 132-155 Native Americans who were supposed 
to be on the lists in 1990. R. 1263. 
Judge Anderson was asked to strike the lists and not use them. 
He refused. R. 694-696; R. 776-783; see also R. 1602, Page 60. 
Judge Anderson made it clear that the numbers on the lists were 
acceptable because he was not bound by the standards of the Consent 
Decree, R. 696, and in fact would not use the Agreement's criteria 
for inclusion of Indian jurors. R. 1602, Pages 59-60. Judge 
Anderson's actions established two conflicting standards, one for 
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I In'1 judiciary's administrative body f hat prepare the lists foi his 
use and the othe; 1 y to himself as the only 
judge using the lists County jurj Q97 
That Judge Anderson ases took this double 
standard to heart r * therefore, 
lesser numbers nt Indian jurors) tha-. Judxcxax LOUU 
iudiciary ise threatened the right Native 
Americans to participate fair. orocess, 
9*v. s purpose i ^  the action against Judge Anderson and 
takxny protect Native American jurors 
preventing the judge from legitimizing less* ndians 
jury lists and thereby set himself apart from standard 
requiring idijei iT'iimb"" i »„ "l I ml i,in jurors that was agreed to for 
the Seventh District• See Appellant#s Opening Brief, Crank 1. ,  
Pages Appellants Reply Brief, Crank I,r Pages 11-14. 
The dxsx^ , i I I "I I counsel improper purpose 
established by his ;. the Estrada case 
* indicative motive, Estrada is * probative 
improper purpose sine - demonstrated * 
the judge aided and abetted the Counc... 
Agfeemenl Moreover, the Estrada case was in the record when Judge 
Roth considered sai assumed that he considered 
and rejected the argument that an improper motive was t 
t was being used. 
Counsel's purpose IM1 MIUM |H ipwi in n en ; rpspect because i t 
stems from the continuing cycle of diminished presence lati v e 
Americans on the jury lists that, despite notice and the ready 
availability of an easy fix, bespeaks of purposeful discrimination* 
That the conduct continued once all concerned were on notice was an 
aggravating factor the Court could take into account in imposing 
contempt sanctions. This continuing pattern of exclusion of Native 
American jurors and the judge's role in that exclusion was termed 
flagrantly racist. Although this language was repeatedly 
referenced by the district court in its ruling imposing sanctions, 
it was an appropriate means of describing the judge's conduct that 
persisted despite notice that it was wrong. 
A person who continues unlawful conduct, such as the continued 
use of the bad jury lists after having been placed on notice, is 
committing wilful and egregious acts. The record bears this out. 
See R. 692-693 (notice to Judge Anderson); 685-688; 690-692 
(continued use of lists while Judge Anderson was acting in privity 
with the Judicial Council); R. 694-696 (Judge Anderson's rcsfusal to 
take corrective action despite being placed on notice). Counsel's 
research disclosed law that held that continuing wrongful acts 
after having been placed on notice bespeaks of intentional racial 
discrimination as a matter of law. See Appellant's Reply Brief, 
Crank I. Pages 16-17. That judge's continuing conduct after having 
been placed on notice constitutes wilful racial discrimination as 
a factual finding was attested to by an expert in an affidavit. Dr. 
J. Dennis Willigan Seventh Affidavit, R. 1146-1148, I 49, Pages 23-
25. This accounts for the characterization that the judge's 
conduct was flagrantly racist. Thus, counsel's statement about 
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y racist conduct does not indicate i Improper purpose 
because **" was made ludge's overall 
participation in institutionalized racism. 
IIy I li« I '"• the- enforcement and contempt motion was filed in 
September, 199 luciye Anderson I »iiJ trials 
involving defendants ncluding some Native Americans, who were 
unaWcl .,,1 ,, wr.n» fundamentally defective because 
they improperly excluded Indian jurors II", d'MI l/'JI I l< i I if i l l s 
had been scheduled• '*<* iolation of the Agreement by the 
Counc *a^avated by the sustained use 
of the discriminatory lists by Judge Andersons in l*i :„ - .|jei a, 1 i.ni .in. I 
management of San Juan's jury system on the district court level. 
Counsel igainst the judge is thus 
apparent from the • ounsel had an eye to ssn 
Drobleir adopting esser standard 
for inclusion while using 
deficient lists. Counsel was motivated lo correct the problem 
roblem the future Thai counsel's purpose 
,s proper every respect - . Leceii! M>y F^ nttt where the 
Council provided notice that its jury lists are, once again, In 
Agreement. K. •» 0 M S - } 0c* ' i i s t. s w i th deficient 
numbers of Native Americans are nuw nr,,,'| ,... | ie 
Seventh District Court for San Juan County, :including Judge 
Aiitlet yum 11 iii n'vcli* f discrimination that motivated counsel 
years ago remains all too ;•.,.. present. 
(b) The district court's opinion conflicts with 
prior rulings that counsel had a proper 
purpose. The use of Rule 11(b)(1) violated 
the mandate of this Court in 
Crank J. 
There is nothing in the record that documents counsel's 
alleged improper purpose. See Point 2(a), supra. However, there 
are rulings by the district court, affirmed by this Court, which 
held that counsel's purpose was proper. The district court was 
obligated to not only give great weight to these rulings but to be 
bound by them as well. That the district court ignore the effect 
of these rulings constitutes clear error. 
The district court, Judge Roth, found that counsel had no 
improper purpose. This Court upheld this finding. Crank I, 20 P.2d 
307, 316, 1 32. That counsel had a proper purpose throughout the 
case at the trial level is supported by Judge Roth's expression of 
his feelings in talking to the attorneys as he announced his 
decision from the bench at the end of the trial: 
The first thing I would like to say is that in my opinion from 
what I have seen of this case and during these last two days, 
I believe that on both sides of this case the parties are 
properly motivated and well intentioned. Both trying to solve 
a similar problem but doing it in different ways from 
different prospective. And while I agree and disagree with 
both of you to some extent, I don't see any villains in this 
courtroom. R. 1645, Page 395. 
The pronouncement of an experienced trial judge who had been in 
this case for five years and had first-hand exposure to the 
evidence and contentions of the lawyers, expressed some five months 
after the denial of sanctions, where he could find nothing bad to 
say about anyone, and was only complimentary, should have been 
given great weight by the district court. Indeed, a ruling of a 
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propeii inn | M i, .I I1 I he district court that is affirmed by this Court 
is the law ol the case. 250 
(Utah 1988 failure :. abide ivy these favorable rulings is 
reviewed by this Court without 
giving any deference *2d 
"
(|
 ''-
1
 4 24-425, 1 1/" The sanctions are in error and must therefore 
overturned unu> standard. Id. 
The district court's ruling also violates the rema 
Court. The district court remand must follow the 
mandate ot the appellate 'his 
Court ordered the district court to make determinations regaraj. 
i ^ Rule 11(b)(1) was not 
included in the mandate* oee Cranic 
"I H M'he reason i r- this is that Judge Roth, and then this Court 
i II "i diik 11(b) ( I aes by finding \AerfAlfA 
that counsel acted I.II quod taith. Thi i" , i h 'iiled iM^^ ifiqfc 
that Rule 11(b)(1) may be the basis for sanctions, see Point One, * ($2^ 
supra, '"!" II • ii'i'i1" i: - i 'i I -i in any other way be used J$^Pr\ 
remand.
 t 
POINT THREE 
k u x e 21(b)(2) is not a valid basis for sanctions 
because the claims were viable, based on Utah law or 
the law from other jurisdictions. Counsel also had a 
plausible argument based on objectively reasonable 
research of claims that were an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law 
or the making of new law. 
Rule 11(b) (2) states ,"" I he claims, defenses ana 
emi it en I i ni«. therein are warranted by existing law _ ion 
z / 
frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law or the establishment of new law*" This places the 
legal viability of the claims against Judge Anderson at issue. 
There were three claims: (1) that Judge Anderson aided and abetted 
the Council in its violation of the Consent Decree; (2) that Judge 
Anderson violated the Consent Decree's provision regarding 
inclusion of Native Americans in the jury lists, set out in ! 4 of 
the Agreement and (3), that Judge Anderson violated the provision 
regarding compliance with the constitution, laws and regulations, 
J 8 of the Agreement. Judge Roth addressed the last two claims, 
ruling that there was no cause of action for violation of the 
Agreement. R. 1185-1189 (order); R. 1600, Pages 3-8 (ruling from 
bench) . Judge Roth focused only on the question of the legal 
sufficiency of the claim and did not address the factual 
allegations. This Court ruled on claims involving the alleged 
violation of the Agreement. Crank I, 20 P.3d 307, 314-315. 
Counsel's primary claim is that Judge Anderson, as a non-
party, aided and abetted the Council in its violation of the 
consent decree. The elements of this claim are: 
a. A non-party is acting in concert with and in privity with 
a party to a court order; 
b. The non-party has notice of the order. 
c. A party to the court order is violating the order. 
d. The non-party is aware that the party is violating the 
order. 
e. The non-party acts or fails to act with the purpose of 
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abetting the party In its violation of the Order. 
JS .^ itier +™ bring «i " " ' * : lg Il a :i :i n, mportant 
aspect of theory that counsel had t abstantiate vhether a 
contempt violation of /i ourt's 
ordei >earch revealed that there is a claim that 
against - .on-party for aiding and abetting a person or entity who l/JlMJv^ 
— — - •—• • - — — — • — _
 § I^MA^I 
i.es a court order. This principle is universally recognized /Z * ^> 
by many jurisdictions. Despite IInt universal accepi 
theory, neither' Judge Roth or this Court in Cranfc I ever addressed 
this claim acknowledged at least • 
part ")f the aiding and abetting claim iscussing the liabi I i I y 
non-parties terms of the applicatior t Utah statutes. See 
argument
 f infra . Tin.; i i iiiiii I iiiid j il-in limbic acknowledged 
plaintiff's claim Crank I by discussing claims that plaintj.it 
In Crank I , t In* "ourt. run together various 
claims lor discussion purposes but i HI my u 
was no cause of action against the Judge for alleged violations 
1 l i e • U|neenieii1 .strict court in turn focused only on the 
alleged violatior * • • \greement. "1 In ;- Inl ..! «u pr uv I t\r prrsprr 
basis for sanctions, particularly where the district court failed 
ibetting claim. See R. 2057-2069 
(ruling)* .4J,«, *...i« mistakenly consi i III-"- > n» i M i i 
a <= r* legal conclusion that constitutes clear error. Accordingly, 
i i correction of error standard „ 
3
 Judge Anderson also did not address the aiding and abetting 
claim on remand. R. 1744-1819 (memorandum); u„ 2022-2032 (reply 
memorandum). 
review. Bernard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1234-1235. 
It is apparent that Judge Anderson's culpability under aiding 
and abetting principles is an arguable point. Plaintiff claimed 
that the judge, as a non-party, acted in concert with and in 
privity with the Judicial Council in aiding and abetting the 
Council's violations of the Consent Decree. There were facts 
alleged which support this claim. See Point Four, infra* 
The right of a court to hold a non-party in contempt for 
aiding and abetting a party who is violating a court order is well 
recognized throughout the United States. This considerable body of 
law was repeatedly referenced in various plaintiff's memoranda. 
^\See, e.g., Plaintiff's Opening Supreme Court Brief.Crank I. Pages 
/ 17-23. In this one brief alone counsel found support for this 
widely accepted principle of law in an opinion of the United States 
Supreme Court, three cases from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
a Sixth Circuit opinion, and a Second Circuit case. See Id. Many 
other federal cases were also cited, including district court cases 
in Alabama, Pennsylvania and Virginia. These cases are hardly 
exhaustive of this area of the law. Thus, it can be said that 
enforcement actions against non-parties who aid and abet a party 
who is violating a court order involve a legal principle* that is 
black letter law. See also Wright and Miller, Federal Practice & 
Procedure, Civil 2d, § 2956. 
Liability for aiding and abetting a party who violates a court 
order is therefore a plausible argument. A plausible argument is 
not frivolous. Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917, 970 (Utah 
30 
1993 \ jciven the aiding and abetting claim viewed as a good 
tax argument existing law, the 
claim complies with Rule t* :•
 4 
Counsel need only show that his research into the i 
facts Is "objectively reasonalil nilci ill I I I i < r i n n s t a n c e s , " 
Taylo Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 930 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting 
»' i if i ft (If., p 2d 1229, 1 2 3 6 ) . Counsel need not come 
the correct conclusion; he need only 
inquiry. Id.; see also Barnard I UtaL „>UL*. ..** , tu, P.2d 93 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Civil 2d^ „ 
1335. 
easonable inquiry and research by counsel in Crank produced 
a WF although not 
Utah, that supported the theory ion-parties being heio 
contemr * aiding and abetting a party's violation of 
order. Counse interpret filing 
was at least plausible Barnard v iii.dli State Bar, 85 i 
920, Thus, reliance on the case law from many other jurisdictions 
meets the test that the reseai*.:!. WJL. JIJJP*..111 I1,1" a'/on^f l«i 
fact that years later the Supreme Court denied liability does 
IHHII I il I in i' i nif'iiiiK in I in I mi nt sanctions. * l20-921. 
The language in Utah procedur* i|j|inrl "i nloi i-iiiem! I 
orders against non-parties: 
an "[injunction] shall be binding only upon the parties to the 
action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and 
attorneys, and upon persons in active concert or participation 
with them who receive notice in person or through counsel, or 
otherwise, of the order," (Emphasis supplied). 
Relying on the plain meaning of this provision is objectively 
reasonable* 
The Agreement of the Parties has language which arguably runs 
the reach of the injunction to non-parties: 
The Agreementf f 12, states: "This Agreement of Parties, and 
tv*30 ivv ~ 1 any Order of the Court, shall be binding on the heirs, 
v^ tf ~~^ successors, and assigns of the parties hereto, including 
r vK pU any courts of general jurisdiction that may succeed the 
^\y present Seventh District Court For San Juan County." R. 656. 
*c (Emphasis supplied) . 
It was objectively reasonable for counsel to rely on this language. 
The Agreement/ f 4(a), requires a jury reform plan and bestows 
discretion to implement the plan on the Council and 
"...those acting for and in its behalf...". (Emphasis 
supplied). 
It was objectively reasonable for counsel to rely on the plain 
meaning of this language. 
The Agreement, I 8, states: 
"Defendant/ and all those acting in concert with it, shall/ in 
regards to jury selection procedures and activities in the 
Seventh Judicial District Court for San Juan Countyf abide by 
all applicable lawsf regulations, and constitutional 
provisions." (Emphasis supplied). 
It was objectively reasonable for counsel to rely on the plain 
meaning of this language. 
The Agreement, f 13, provides that the court shall retain 
jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the Agreement. The 
Agreement refers to "parties" in the plural when dealing with 
compliance. This can arguably include Judge Anderson because he 
was a party at the time the settlement was negotiated/ as well as 
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being, through his attorney f a signatory to the Agreement. ""' was 
objectivel. . "i "i " I I • 
The Consent Decree also has language which arguably implicates 
i i >ii -parties: • • 
"file Consent Decree, Ill \ • • i.«11 i j i . : 
"The Defendant Utah Judicial Council, its agents, officers, 
successors and all persons acting in concert or participating 
with it, are hereby ordered to comply with the provisions of 
the Agreement of Parties." R 679. (Emphasis supplied). 
Il I I I i <"" Ill11") mi easonable for counsel rely on the plain 
meaning these documents In formulating i III -i j. Il II ISH 
especially where the language so closely follows the provisions 
Although both Judge Roth a™ Supreme Couz I luiiruseni 
interpretation of the parties' Agreement " holding that 
plain tiff's ::::] a :i iris fa i 3 ecij the 1 a ng m lage oi m e Agreement and 
Consent Decree^wajs^iiQt the only leqaX-JAeory^jin^ claim use< I 1: j 
plaintiff. J.U W«^ reasonable for counsel the many cases 
applying the process of enforcing court orders aga. *st non-parties 
whic- ore found^in the jurisprudence of _other jurisdictions 
oughout^ the United States. This is appropriate where there is 
T]fa
^ <-ase 1 aw on,, the r law but 
there is law from other jurisdictions, sanctions are inappropriate. 
Sorensen, 910 1 1228 (Utah 1996) ("In 
viev i, .. ^s u in J I 
law h • cannot hold that the trial court was required 
onduct ** "he Bar * * «- ****i* counsel fell below 
the standard set i 
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reasonable inquiry in the form of research that produced case law 
of other jurisdictions, demonstrates that Rule 11 was not violated. 
Most telling, the Supreme Court on appeal in Crank implicitly 
acknowledged the validity of plaintiff's legal theory that non-
parties can be held in contempt of court. The Court said, 
"Clearly, a trial court has the power to hold non-parties in 
contempt if those parties conspire to frustrate a lawful order of 
the Court." Crank I, 20 P.3d 307, 314, I 25. The Court arrived at 
this conclusion by using existing Utah statutory law, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-32-1(9) (unlawful interference with process or 
proceedings of court); Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1(5) (disobedience of 
lawful judgment or order), but did not actually refer to the aiding 
and abetting claim. In discussing the sufficiency of the factual 
allegations regarding what this Court thought was an allegation of 
an interference with the Agreement, Crank 1, 20 P.3d 307, I 29, the 
Court again implicitly acknowledged, in a general way, the basis 
for plaintiff's claim, referring to it this time as a conspiracy 
theory. Id. at 315, f 30. This supports plaintiff's argument that 
no violation of Rule 11(b)(2) occurred because the claims were 
based on existing Utah law. 
The Supreme Court's implicit acknowledgement in Crank of the 
basic legal theory and principle underpinning claims against non-
parties negates any basis for sanctions under Rule 11(b)(2) because 
the claim is warranted under proper construction of existing Utah 
law. See Crank I, 20 P.3d 307, 314, f? 24-25. Rule 11(b)(2) is 
also complied with because plaintiff's theory, if it does not come 
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within the statutory language used by this Court, amounts to a good 
faith argument for the extension of the law or even the making of 
new law. This is perfectly in line with the cases from other 
jurisdictions which apply the aiding and abetting principle. See, 
e.g., Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14-15 (1945); 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. v. Keystone Freight 
Lines, Inc., 123 F.2d 326, 329 (10th Cir. 1941). 
The foregoing research and plain meaning of language in the 
settlement documents and orders is in contrast with the district 
court's ruling that Rule 11(b)(2) was violated because counsel 
never made an argument to extend, modify or reverse the law or 
establish new law. R. 2067. The Court's conclusion is apparently 
based on the ruling that counsel made only one claim, a claim that 
the judge had violated the Agreement which contained no duty 
applicable to the judge. Counsel made the claim that Judge 
Anderson, while in privity with and acting in concert with the 
Council, aided and abetted the Council in its violation of a court 
order. This claim was not based, as the district court incorrectly 
assumed, on what Judge Anderson could or could not do in complying 
with or abiding by the Agreement. It was based on what the judge 
did do or did not do that aided and abetted the Council. This 
Court reviews the district court's legal conclusions under a 
correction of error standard. Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 
1234-1235. No deference is given to the trial court's conclusions 
of law. Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422-425, 424, f 12. The district 
court's failure to take into account a particular claim and the 
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ntn 
legal theory and supporting case law underlying this claim 
constitutes clear error on a question of law. The decision based on 
clear error should be overturned. See Id. 
POINT FOUR 
Rule 11(b)(3) is not a basis for sanctions because the 
claims had proper evidentiary support. Sanctions cannot 
be imposed where counsel was not provided with timely 
notice and an opportunity to cure the alleged 
factual inconsistencies• 
Rule 11(b)(3) requires "the allegations and other factual 
contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery." 
The district court imposed sanctions based on insufficient factual 
allegations and in so doing relied on language in this Court's 
opinion in Crank I. R. 2068. 
Judge Anderson in his initial trial motion never provided 
notice that he was seeking sanctions for deficient factual 
allegations. See R. 1001-1029, 1059-1079 (Motion For Sanctions, 
Memoranda); R. 763-788 (Motion to Strike, Memorandum). He relied 
only on Rule 11(b)(1) (improper purpose) and Rule 11(b)(2) (claims 
must be warranted by existing law, etc.). Neither counsel nor the 
trial court were apprised of any claim regarding the sufficiency of 
the facts under Rule 11(b) (3). 
Judge Roth never addressed a sufficiency of the evidence 
allegation in the motions to strike and for sanctions when ruling 
from the bench. See Order, R. 1185-1189. Rather, Judge Roth 
limited his decision on the Motion to Strike to a construction of 
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the Agreement of Parties and his ruling on the sanctions motion to 
counsel's good faith. Id. 
Rule 11(c) requires that any motion for sanctions "describe 
the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b)." On 
appeal Judge Anderson for the first time raised the issue of the 
facts in Crank I. Plaintiff complained about Judge Anderson's 
attempt to improperly supplement the record on appeal with new 
facts. Footnote 1, supra; see also Appellant's Reply Brief, Crank 
J, Pages 1-4. This gave counsel no opportunity to address the 
question on the trial level by curing the alleged defects or 
withdrawing the pleading. Under such circumstances, courts are 
reluctant to allow new issues to be raised for the first time on 
appeal. See State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990) (court 
cannot consider new arguments made for the first time on appeal). 
Because the question of the sufficiency of the factual allegations 
was not presented with the specificity required under Rule 11(c), 
Rule 11(b)(3) is not an appropriate basis for sanctions. 
In addition, the failure at the outset to provide notice of 
alleged insufficient pleading of the facts raises serious due 
process concerns that counsel was not afforded a fair opportunity 
in the district court to respond or cure the alleged defects. 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d, § 1337; 
see also Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 208 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 2000). 
Following appeal on remand it was, of course, too late to cure the 
alleged factual insufficiencies and change the record. Imposing 
penalties well after the time when the alleged factual deficiencies 
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could have been properly addressed at the outset if proper notice 
had been given also does not square with this Court's ruling that 
due process and the opportunity to be heard are mandeitory when 
sanctions may be imposed. Crank I, 20 P.3d 307f 314, II 25-27. It 
also does not square with the rule that more stringent due process 
standards may become applicable where, as seen in Crank on remand, 
the sanctions move from compensatory to the punitive end of Rule 
11's spectrum, as was the case in Crank, see Point One, supra; 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d, § 1336. 
The Court in Crank said that there were no concrete 
allegations that the judge conspired with the Council or that he 
hampered the Council's compliance efforts. Crank I, 20 P.3d 307, 
315, f 29. The Court also said that the motion instituting the 
action against Judge Anderson "...did not provide any sworn facts 
that indicated a violation of the Agreement or an attempt to 
interfere with its implementation." Id. at 315, I 29. These 
pronouncements pertained to claims that plaintiff never made (i.e., 
hampering and interfering).4 The decision mentioned conspiracy, 
also a claim that was never made.5 Despite the fact that counsel 
4
 Interference with a court order may be a contempt of court. 
see, e.g., United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 575 (1906). 
However, it was never alleged that the judge sought to interfere 
with the Council's compliance with the court order. 
5
 A conspiracy between the Council and the Judge was never 
alleged, nor is it essential to the claim that the Council violated 
a court order and that the judge helped them do it. A conspiracy 
alleged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires an agreement or some 
understanding between a private party and a state actor to deprive 
someone of a constitutional right under color of state law. See, 
e.g., Dixon v. City of Lawton, Okl.f 898 F.2d 1443, 1449 n. 6 (10th 
Cir. 1990). Crank is a Section 1983 case and the use of the term 
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never made such claims, the district court parroted this Court's 
language, imposing sanctions because there were no facts supporting 
a claim of interfering or hampering. R. 2068. Crank I's 
pronouncements about claims that counsel never made were 
unnecessary to the Court's ruling on the substantive issues and 
should therefore be viewed as dicta. See Callahan v. Salt Lake 
City, 125 P. 863, 864-865 (1912); OXY USA, Inc. v. Babbitt, 230 
F.3d 1178, 1184-1185 (10th Cir. 2000). To the extent this Court 
led the district court astray by steering it to consider the issue 
of factual allegations outside the context of claims actually made, 
this Court should set matters straight and not allow sanctions to 
be imposed. 
What little was said in Crank I about the facts did involve a 
claim plaintiff did make about an alleged violation of the 
Agreement. Although this Court in Crank I found that the factual 
allegations were not concrete, it did not say that no facts were 
alleged at all. The Court's pronouncements about the facts did not 
specifically mention the aiding and abetting claim. Nor did the 
Court identify and discuss the specific facts alleged in sworn 
pleadings and affidavits as they bear on the aiding and abetting 
claim. There are specific facts supporting this claim, as argued, 
infra. Under these circumstances, it was clear error for the 
district court to rely on this Court's pronouncements as a basis 
for sanctions. 
Plaintiff's allegations were supported by affidavits of 
"conspiracy" to describe plaintiff's claims is misleading. 
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witnesses attesting to first-hand knowledge of facts, including 
facts and opinions by plaintiff's experts. This factual showing is 
quite detailed. In addition to the arguments and facts made 
directly about Judge Anderson, additional issues and facts were 
raised about the Council which also implicated Judge Anderson. 
This certainly illustrates that counsel was carefully dealing with 
the facts as they relate to his legal theory of the case. 
This is not a case where allegations were made with no evidentiary 
support at all. Far from it. The district court did not consider 
or give any weight at all to the following factual allegations that 
supported plaintiff's aiding and abetting claim and that the 
Agreement had been violated: 
- The Motion For Order to Show Cause, R. 684-725. The Motion 
is Verified. At the very outset, the motion clearly states that 
its objective is to appoint a receiver to implement the Agreement, 
obtain an order enforcing the Agreement, and requests an Order to 
Show Cause for contempt sanctions for violating or aiding and 
abetting the violation of the Agreement and Consent Decree. The 
Motion describes the Agreement and background of the case and 
depicts the role of the Judicial Council and Judge Anderson and 
alleges that they are in privity and acting in concert. Id. at Page 
2. The requirement of the Agreement that Native Americans are to 
be included in certain numbers and the jury selection process are 
described in detail. Id. at Pages 3-5. The deficient numbers of 
Native Americans on the 1997 lists are described and documented in 
detail in terms of actual numbers and by the use of percentages, 
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called disparities. Id. at Pages 5-7. Affidavits of experts 
provide additional documentation for these verified allegations. 
See Seventh Affidavit of Irene Black and Sixth Affidavit of Dr. J. 
Dennis Williqan. Verified allegations further state that there were 
10 jury trials conducted by Judge Anderson in 1997, identified by 
case name and docket number. Motion. Pages 7-8. Fourteen 
additional jury trials for 1997 to be conducted by Judge Anderson 
were identified as upcoming, Id. at Pages 8-9. Notice of the 
deficient jury lists was provided to the Council and Judge 
Anderson. Id. at Pages 9-10. Conversely, notice of the violations 
to the Court required under the Agreement was not provided. Id. at 
Page 12. Despite notice having been given by plaintiff, the 
violations continue. Id. at Pages 10-11. The verified allegations 
then specify the facts of Judge Anderson's aiding and abetting the 
Council's violations. Id. at Pages 11-12. These include using the 
lists; concluding the jury process with jury trials and other 
procedures which permanently locked out the Native Americans who 
should have been on the lists but were not; failing to provide 
notice and warning to those involved in the jury selection process, 
including parties and their attorneys in pending cases and the 
jurors in the class in Crank and class counsel; renouncing the 
Agreement and refusing to apply the Agreement's standards during 
the qualification and trial process; and by intentionally 
discriminating against Native American jurors. The verified 
allegations further document, through plaintiff's expert, Dr. J. 
Dennis Willigan, that fixing the lists and curing the violations 
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can be done quickly and inexpensively. Id. at Page 12; see also Dr. 
J. Dennis Williaan Affidavit, f 14. Notwithstanding the 
availability of easy means to fix the problem, the Council and 
Judge Anderson did not employ any of them, or any other. Jd. at 
Page 12. The plaintiff documents reasonable but unsuccessful 
efforts to resolve the alleged violations. Id. at 12. The Motion 
details the relief requested, including setting the matter for 
hearing; entering preliminary and permanent injunctive relief; 
appointing a receiver to implement compliance; issuing an Order to 
Show Cause for Contempt; the imposition of standard contempt 
sanctions, including fines, jail sentences and damage awards to the 
class; and awarding plaintiff his fees and costs. Id. at Pages 13-
14. 
Motion's Supporting Memorandum, R. 726-740. The 
memorandum discusses the facts in detail. Memorandum, at Pages 1-5. 
Previous documentation is incorporated which bears on the current 
controversy, including Dr. Willigan's Third and Fourth Affidavits. 
Id. at Page 4. In the Statement of Law, the Court's enforcement 
authority is discussed. Xd. at Pages 5-7. The Memorandum discusses 
the duties of the Council and Judge Anderson. Id. at Pages 7-8. The 
Memorandum provides authority regarding enforcement and contempt 
against non-parties who are in privity and in concert with parties 
while aiding and abetting violations of court orders. Id. at Pages 
7-9. The violations are then discussed in more detail. Id. at Pages 
10-13. The remedies sought by plaintiff are set forth. Id. at 
Pages 13-14. 
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Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion For 
Order to Show Cause, R. 1100-1154. The Council submitted a 
Response to the Verified Motion which included affidavits from 
Judge Anderson and an attorney with the Court Administrator's 
Office, Brent Johnson. See Council's Response, R. 796-861. The 
Reply includes Dr. Willigan's twenty seven page Seventh Affidavit. 
Dr. Willigan provides considerable detail in refuting the 
allegations made by Judge Anderson and Attorney Johnson. Dr. 
Willigan's findings, as an expert sociologist, include the 
observation that given the statistical data that presents clear 
statistical evidence that racial bias is present and which 
documents the under representation of Native American jurors which 
placed those in the jury selection process on notice, with those 
responsible having deliberately chosen to not utilize "a readily 
available, cost-effective solution (e.g., supplemental sampling) to 
promptly remove the racial bias, but rather opt for an alternative 
solution that offers no immediate relief, taking years to 
implement, and which rests on an administrative foundation which is 
characterized by it's proponents as '...not likely [to] be easily 
maintained,' a sociologist such as myself would normally be led, 
ceteris paribus, to report evidence supporting a finding of 
intentional racial discrimination." See Affidavit, Pages 23-25. 
Thus, an expert, upon carefully analyzing the evidence and data, 
including facts implicating Judge Anderson, found racial 
discrimination. The Memorandum further discusses the facts and 
violations. Memorandum, at Pages 1-5. The facts underlying 
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defenses asserted, including good faith, attempts to fix the 
deficient lists, and other matters, including questionable claims 
and allegations by Attorney Johnson, are thoroughly refuted. Id. at 
Pages 5-11. In addition, false and misleading statements by the 
judge and attorney are discussed in light of Dr. Willigan,s work. 
Id. at Pages 11-14. In regards to evidence presented by the 
Council, through Judge Anderson, that it is in compliance for the 
year 1998, plaintiff provided a thorough refutation of this 
allegation. Id. at 14-16. The Memorandum further discusses 
plaintiff's allegations of constitutional violations which are 
brought into the Motion because compliance with the Const]Ltution is 
mandated by the Agreement, 1 8. Id. at Pages 16-20. Judge 
Anderson's role in jury selection is discussed. Ld. at Pages 20-21. 
Remedies sought by plaintiff are identified, including mandating 
supplemental sampling to immediately resolve the problems. Id. at 
Pages 21-22. In addition, a transcript of portions of the Estrada 
case are provided in support of the allegations implicating Judge 
Anderson. 3Jd. at Exhibit B. 
Dr. Willigan submitted an eighth affidavit. R. 1215-1253. 
This affidavit documents the continued exclusion of Native 
Americans from the jury lists in 1998, confirming that 132-155 
Indian jurors were not included on the lists. Id. at Page 4, I 15. 
Dr. Willigan provides additional demographic data which bears on 
the alleged violations. Id. at Pages 5-6 and provides an opinion 
that the presence of Indian jurors has been "substantially 
diminished." ^d. at Page 6, f 18. 
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Expert Reports. Dr. Willigan submitted an expert report 
and a supplement to that report. The Council through its expertf 
Mr. Hachmanf submitted a report. Both experts testified at trial. 
Both experts discussed the facts in detail. 
Plaintiff's Amended Motion. R. 1256-1307. Documentation 
submitted with the Amended Motion included the Affidavit of David 
Bancroft, further documenting the numbers of Native Americans on 
the jury lists; the Eighth Affidavit of Dr. Willigan; and August 
14, 1998 Hearing Transcript. The Motion asked, inter alia, that the 
Court construe the Agreement and/or amend the Consent Decree to 
address the conflicting jury list standards created by Judge 
Anderson's ruling in the Estrada case. Motion, at Pages 15-16. 
The Council filed a Motion to Strike Dr. Willigan's 
Seventh Affidavit. R. 1157-1158 (motion); R. 1159-1164 
(memorandum). Plaintiff responded. R. 1165-1178 (memorandum). 
Plaintiff's Response discussed the basis for Dr. Willigan' work in 
detail and its admissability. There was no ruling on this Motion. 
The Council filed a Motion for Protective Order 
requesting that plaintiff be denied discovery. R. 789-793. 
Plaintiff responded. R. 1086-1099. The facts and the need for 
additional fact finding were discussed. Discovery was eventually 
allowed, but did not include Judge Anderson. E.g., R. 1344-1345 
(stipulation extending discovery). 
Partial Summary Judgment Motion on Plaintiff's Amended 
Motion, Memorandum. R. 1364-1366 (Motion); R. 1367-1430 
(Memorandum) . Attachments included the Court Docket Index; Brent 
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Johnson Deposition Transcript; Affidavit of Attorney Swenson; 
August 14, 1998 Hearing Transcript; and the Council's Judicial 
Protocol. Judge Anderson's continuing role in the alleged 
violations is discussed in plaintiff's supporting memorandum, at 
Pages 22-24. 
Stipulation. R. 1445-1446. The parties entered into a 
stipulation. The parties stipulated to the numbers of Native 
Americans on the 1997 and 1998 jury lists. The Council admitted it 
did not file annual reports. The Council admitted that it did not 
request from the trial court an extension of time in which to come 
into compliance with the Agreement. The Council admitted that it 
did not employ supplemental sampling in 1997 and 1998. 
- Plaintiff took the depositions of Attorney Johnson and a* 
computer specialist with the Court Administrator's Office, Mr. 
Yoshinaga. Both deponents discussed the facts at length, including 
facts which implicated Judge Anderson. 
The foregoing is illustrative, although not exhaustive, of the 
role the facts played in this litigation. This was ignored by the 
district court in imposing sanctions. The district court's ruling 
is essentially a legal conclusion because it construes and 
interprets the pleadings and other documents in the record. It 
should be reviewed for legal correctness, giving the court no 
deference. Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422, 424-425, I 12. Under 
this standard, the district court's gross misconstruction and 
misinterpretation of the facts in the record is clear error. 
Despite the considerable detailed factual allegations that 
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were often fact-specific to Judge Anderson's alleged role in aiding 
and abetting the violations, it is significant, and troubling in 
light of the sanctions that were imposed much later in the case, 
that Judge Anderson never timely raised the question of the 
sufficiency of facts. There are procedural devices to do so.6 
Rather than do this, Judge Anderson did exactly the opposite. He 
filed a Motion to Strike which admitted the facts.7 Given Judge 
Anderson's admission of the allegations, it is understandable that 
he would not then turn around and challenge the facts or attempt to 
introduce evidence. 
It is also understandable that plaintiff's counsel would not 
address factual insufficiencies, other than to point out, in the 
context of the Motion to Strike, that it is an inappropriate remedy 
to resolve factual issues that may be at issue in a case where the 
facts are so abundant, detailed and very specific as to key issues. 
See Plaintiff's Opening Supreme Court Brief, Crank I, Pages 28-30. 
The judge's failure to address this issue up front now places 
counsel in the difficult position of having had to deal with the 
question well after the fact without having been afforded the 
chance to be heard or to take action to cure the alleged 
6
 See Rule 12(e) (motion for more definite statement); Rule 56 
(summary judgment). If there was a question about the sufficiency 
of the facts, the trial court would have afforded plaintiff a 
chance to amend the factual allegations. Sawyer v. County of Creek, 
908 F.2d 663, 665-666 (10th Cir. 1990). 
7
 See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure; Civil 2d, 
§ 1380; Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 516 (1959); Mille Lacs Band 
of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 952 F.Supp. 1362, 1395 (D.C.Minn. 
1997). 
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deficiency. As argued, supra, this is contrary to the process set 
out in Rule 11(c) which requires notice, with specificity. It is 
also raises grave due process concerns. Given the important role 
that the numerous substantial factual allegations played throughout 
this case that were specific to Judge Anderson, it was clear error 
for the district court to misconstrue and misinterpret the record 
in levying sanctions for insufficient factual allegations under 
Rule 11(b)(3). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the judgment and order of the trial 
court and remand the matter to the trial court for a dismissal of 
all claims against Attorney Swenson. 
Dated this 9th day of July^2efl2>. ^ ^ 
c^c^Sr —• 
Eric P. Swenson 
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Eric P. Swenson, Appellant, hereby certifies that he did mail 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief to the attorneys 
for Appellee, as follows: to the attorneys for Judge Anderson, 
Robert L. Anderson and Daniel G. Anderson, Anderson and Anderson, 
P.O. Box 275, Monticello,^J0t£h, 8^535-^ t h i s 9th day of Ju ly , 
2002. Eric P. Swenson 
Appellant 
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Eric P. Swenson, # 3171 
P.O. Box 940 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Telephone: (801) 587-2843 
Jensie L. Anderson, # 6467 
American Civil Liberties Union 
of Utah Foundation, Inc. 
# 9 Exchange Place, Suite 715 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-9862 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SAN JUAN COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOREN CRANK, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 
Defendant. 
| AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES 
Civil No. 9307-26 
Judge Roth 
The parties desire to settle this litigation by entering into 
this agreement. It is therefore agreed and stipulated as follows: 
1« This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
alleging that the Defendant and others acting in concert with the 
Defendant have committed acts and omissions which have resulted in 
the improper exclusion of Native American jurors in the District 
Court for San Juan County, Utah. Plaintiff maintains that these 
acts and omissions violate the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, comparable provisions 
lEVENTODISTRICTCOURT 
^an.lnanCountv 
^MAY131996 
of the Utah Constitution, and applicable lavs and regulations of 
the State of Utah- Defendant denies these allegations. There is 
a real and actual controversy between the parties in connection 
with such matters. This Court has jurisdiction over this action 
and the parties hereto. 
2. The following constitute agreed facts: 
a. Mr« Crank is an adult Native American resident of 
Montezuma Creek, San Juan County, Utah, and an enrolled member of 
the Navajo Tribe of Indians. 
b. Navajo, Paiute, and Ute Native Americans in San Juan County 
constitute a cognizable group. 
c. Native Americans have been represented on jury lists used 
in and for the Seventh Judicial District Court in the numbers and 
in the disparities listed in the documents attached to this Order, 
Judgment, and Decree as Exhibit A. 
d. The following definitions are incorporated into this 
Agreement; 
The Master List is the merged juror-source list used by the 
Utah Judicial Council. 
The District Court Questionnaire List is the juror-list for 
the San Juan county District Court which is sent by the Judicial 
Council VIA the Court Administrator's Office to the Clerk of Court* 
The Clerk then sends qualification questionnaires to the persons on 
that list. 
The Qualified List contains those San Juan jurors who are on 
the Master List and the District Court Questionnaire List and have 
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been through I,In-.* 'qualification process and found to be qualified to 
serve as trial jurors i n the San Juan foiinl y District Court. 
" '-Trial Juror Venire is the list of San Juan County District 
Court jurors who are summoned to appear and participate in'the jury 
selection process in. individual tri a 1 s« 
Trial Venire is the final list of San Juan County jurors who 
are selected "h HHIVI? as trial jurors'in a specific case. 
' The foregoing facts and definitions H I e admissible only for 
the purpose of enforcing or modifying this agreement on for' the 
purpose of enforcing our modifying the "orders of this Court in this 
case. 
1. This case is maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 
2 3 i c« k k (b)('^ i 1)1; the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure* The class is 
so numerous that all ctf its members'cannot be ji iiiieii hrieiii there 
are common' questions of law and fact applicable to the class, and 
the claims o,l Plaintiff aii»i typical of the claims of the class. 
Plaintiff has alleged that the Defendant has acted upon |rounds 
generally applicable to the class, which alleged facts, if true, 
would make appropi j aic» final injunctive relief with respect to the 
class'as a whole. -Separate actions by individual membei H mf tlm? 
class would create i risk of inconsistent adjudications with 
respecl t;„o the I iicll vl.cii members of the'class and would, in turn, 
establish incompatible standards of conduct l!oi Line Defendant 
Plaintiff shall represent a class of present and prospective San 
Juan County la/ti v e American jurors. Notice of this agreement shall 
be provided to the class as follows: 
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a* The proposed decree, this agreement, and a statement that 
any member of the plaintiff class may file a written statement of 
objections with the Clerk of Court on or before a date set by the 
Court, which counsel recommend be approximately 45 days after this 
agreement is filed with the Court, shall be posted within three 
days after the Court so orders as follows: 
(i) Plaintiff shall post the documents at the Navajo Chapter 
Houses for those units of Navajo local government serving the Utah 
Portion of the Navajo Reservation* Plaintiff shall also post said 
documents at a suitable community meeting place located within the 
Dte Mountain Ote Reservation at White Mesa, San Juan County, Utah* 
(ii) Plaintiff shall also provide notice by causing the terms 
of this Agreement and the proposed Order of the Court to be 
presented at meetings of the aforementioned Chapters. 
(iii) The Defendant shall provide notice by posting a copy of 
this Agreement, the proposed decree, and the Notice to Class at the 
office of the Clerk of the Seventh District Court for San Juan 
County, and at the other offices of the Clerk of Court in the 
Seventh District, and the San Juan County Attorney's Office. 
Defendant shall also post notice of this settlement by advertising 
this Agreement, Notice to Class and the proposed decree in a 
newspaper of general circulation in San Juan County for a period of 
one month. Notice shall also be accomplished by advertising in the 
Navajo tribal newspaper. The Navajo Times. 
(iv) Plaintiff and Defendant shall file proof with the Court 
that they have done the foregoing in affidavit form within 10 days 
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after said acts have been completed• Any objections should be 
heard by the Court on t fiitp In IM» sot by I lie i oui I , which i-otmsel 
recommend by 60 days after this Agreement is filed with the Court* 
1 Defendant shall formulate and implement a plan to assure 
that Seventh District Court Turors aio rho&fii Irani sources 
reflective of a cross section of the community of San Juan County, 
Defendant and those acting for and in its behalf will have 
reasonable discretion to under tako u1! ions iiml implement policies 
which will comply with the goals of this paragraph and any plan 
filed pursuant LJ this paragraph. The plan, inter alia, shall 
include the fol 1 urn i HCJ: 
a. The names on the District Questionnaire Lists provided to 
the Seventh District Court pursuant to the plan shall be within on 
average, plus oi IIIIIUS,, " |it• i L'IMII 1 I he estimated percentage of 
adult Native Americans in San Juan County in any given year^ This 
requirement shall be implemented as soon is th reasonably 
practicable, ami no LiiLei UMM .lanuary Jl" 19 9', fhe parties 
recognize that there may be administrative difficulties in 
implementing the provisions of this sub-paragraph and that the 
Defendant may fot quod t-atuu petit ion t lie Com I for an extension of 
time in which to bring the jury lists into compliance. Pi ior to 
resorting to further litigation, the parties shall engage in 
reasonable discussions to resolve then differences informally. 
b. The plan shall provide for the use ol a juror-
qualification questionnaire which shall be adequate^ lo determine 
the qualifications of the -jurors. 
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c* The plan shall provide for the collection and proper use 
of demographic data sufficient to comply with applicable statutes 
and regulations* 
d. The plan shall provide for the identification of jurors on 
the Qualified Lists by name, address, and race. 
e. The plan shall also provide for the routine use of 
compulsory process and sanctions which are available under Utah 
state law or as may be available pursuant to any agreement with the 
Navajo or Ute tribes to encourage compliance by jurors with jury 
selection procedures* The parties recognize, however, that 
compulsory process is not currently available* 
f • Nothing in the plan or this agreement shall be construed 
to prevent litigants and jurors from raising in a criminal case or 
in a separate action the question of improper peremptory-juror 
challenges* 
g* The plan shall be filed with the Court within six months 
of this Court's entry of the permanent injunction and decree* 
Plaintiff may within 60 days following submission of the plan file 
with the Court their position regarding any such proposed plan* 
Prior to doing so, the parties shall take reasonable measures to 
informally resolve any differences* The Court may then schedule a 
hearing on the proposed plan* At such hearing, the Court may 
approve the plan, modify the plan, or direct that Defendant submit 
a new plan* If no comments aire received# the plan shall go Into 
immediate effect. 
(h) Defendant may submit new or supplemental plans in the 
6 
manner set forth in this paragraph as may be needed to implement 
the purpose and goals of this agreement. 
5 • The Defendant' shal ] maintain d i 11 s < •» f £ i ce and 1 n the 
office of the Clerk of * le Seventh District Court for San Juan 
County, the following records: 
a. The District Court Questionnaire Lists used for the 
Seventh District Court for San Juan County for the time period in 
which this Court retains jurisdiction over this action. 
b. The Trial Juror Ven i r e ] ists and Tri a] ¥enire lists for 
each case in which such lists are generated for the period of time 
in which this Court retains jurisdiction over this action, 
c. A record of al 1 rompuleery process used to summons jurors 
to jury duty or to complete juror qualification questionnaires* 
cl» A record adequately explaining the basis for al 1 excused 
and disqualified 111111 \ r H 1"1 u 1 1.1 u 1 "I '. u period which this Court 
retains jurisdiction. 
e. Each court-approved plan formulated pursuant le fiile 
Agreement* 
£, Plaintiff, members of the class, and class counsel shall 
be'provided with reasonable access to information pertaining to 
Defendant's compliance with Llus agreement and the court's decree* 
g. For the first three years that this Agreement and the 
Court's Decree is in effect, Defendant shall file ...in annual report 
with this Court stating,, w ith specificity, the acts and procedures 
undertaken to ensure compliance with this Agreement and the plan or 
plans submitted pursuant thereto. 
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6* If Defendant cannot comply with this agreement, the 
Court's decree, or any plan it submits pursuant to this agreement, 
then Defendant shall notify Plaintiff and class counsel, and the 
Court within 60 days of such occurrence. 
7. Upon the expiration of a reasonable period of time 
following the provision of notice to the class, and after resolving 
all objections of the class to this Agreement and the proposed 
decree, the Court shall enter a decree incorporating this Agreement 
therein and restraining and enjoining the parties to abide by the 
terms and provisions of this Agreement. The Court's order will 
specify that the defendant-judges are dismissed from this action* 
8. Defendant, and all those acting in concert with it, shall, 
in regards to jury selection procedures and activities in the 
Seventh Judicial District Court for San Juan County, abide by all 
applicable laws, regulations, and constitutional provisions* 
9* The requirements of this decree may be modified upon a 
showing of a significant change in law or fact* If at the time 
modification is sought the foregoing criteria does not reflect the 
current rule, then the parties shall comply with contemporary 
standards for-the modification of consent decrees under the rules 
of civil procedure* 
10. The parties have made a separate settlement as to the 
payment of the costs and attorneys fees incurred by Plaintiff in 
bringing this action for the period up to and including the date of 
the Court's entry of the permanent injunction and decree. If the 
parties cannot agree as to Plaintiff's costs and fees, the matter 
8 
shall be snhiiii \ I eel to the l.'om I. for resolution* 
11. The parties, or any member of the plaintiff-class, may 
petition the Court, for enforcement of this agreement; the Decree 
01 -iiiiy ordi-M MI subsequent orders issued by the Court, Prior to 
petitioning the Court, the parties shall undertake reasonable 
efforts to resolve such agreements informally 
12. 1 h\.v Agreement of Parties, and any Order of the Court, 
shall he binding on the heirs, successors, and assigns of the 
parties hereto, including any courts of general juri sdxct :1 on that 
may Bucueed » lie present Seventh District Court for San Juan County. 
The parties recognize that there are discussions underway 
concerning the division of San Juan County i nto two counties. 
Should San Juan County be divided, the Defendant shall be afforded 
a reasonable opportunity to formulate a new plan, if necessary. 
13. This Court shall retain jurisdiction )ver this action to 
enforce Lh*> parties' compliance with the terms of this Agreement 
and all orders of the Court Should the Court's retention of 
jurisdiction terminate, Defendant's obligation to dbxde by the 
permanent injuuet ion of the Court shall continue. 
14. Nothing in this Agreement constitutes, or shall be 
construed as, an admission by Defendant a ol any ol Plaintiff's 
alLegations 
Dated this 26th 
Eric £• Swenson 
Jensie L. Anderson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
9 
MaycocK I* Ellen oc. 
David Wright 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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Exhibit A, Agreement of Parties 
Crank v. Utah Judicial Council 
I 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
II1 
Numbers 
209/599 
242/536 
.161/4 32 
107/300 
141/300 
138/300 
152/300 
171/324 
226/500 
190/499 
238/500 
III2 
Percentage£ 
34.89 
45.15 
7 
35.67 
47.00 
46.00 
52.33 
52.78 
45.20 
38.08 
47.60 
IV3 
.^8 Years 
51.68 
51.68 
4 I . fi8 
51.68 
51.68 
51.68 
51.68 
51.68 
51.68 
51.68 
51.68 
V4 
Absolute 
16.79 
6.53 
14.41 
16.01 
4.68 
5.68 
-0.65 
-1.10 
6.48 
13.60 
4.08 
VI5 
Comparative 
32.49 
12.64 
27. H8 
30.98 
9.06 
10.99 
-1.26 
-i.13 
12.54 
26.32 
7.89 
1996 170/500 34*00 51.68 17.68 34.21 
1
 Column II is the number of Native Americans on San Juan 
County jury lists, identified in the Agreement of Parties as the 
District Court Questionnaire List, as counted by Irene Black for 
the years 1990-1996. For the years 1932 to 1970, there were no 
Native Americans on any jury lists. 
2 Coluinri 1JL1 X S t h e percentage of Native Americans on the San 
Juan District Court Questionnaire Lists as counted by Irene Black. 
3 UoJLmnn I V i s tJtie percentage of Native Americans aged 18 
years and older, in San Juan County, recorded in the 1990 U.S. 
Census. The figure, 51.68%, does not take into account any census 
under count, nor does it reflect the growth of the Native American 
population in San Juan County relative to the non-Native American 
population. 
4
 Column ¥ contains the absolute disparities for Native 
Americans. The absolute disparities are calculated by subtracting 
Column III from Column IV. 
5
 Column VI contains the comparative disparities for Native 
Americans. The comparative disparities are calculated by dividing 
column V by column TV and multiply by 100. 
ADDENDUM 
Exhibit 2 , Decree 
Eric P. Swenson, 3 3171 
P.O. Box 940 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Telephone: (801) 587-2843 
Jensie L. Anderson, #6467 
American Civil Liberties Union 
of Utah Foundation, Inc. 
# 9 Exchange Place, Suite 715 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-9862 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SAN JUAN COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOREN CRANK, J R . , 
P l a i n t i f f , 
V. 
UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
tBmauBaammmmBssmmswnstneairBfsniigBsssBsssssgs 
| ORDER AND DECREE 
C i v i l No. 9307-26 
Judge Roth 
s s a a s r s s s x 
The Court has reviewed the Agreement of Parties and has found 
that injunctive relief shall be granted in accordance with it. 
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1- The Court approves and adopts the Agreement of Parties 
dated March 26, 1996 which is hereby incorporated by reference into 
this Judgment ciiiil Decree. 
2. The parties have filed satisfactory proof showing that 
they have provided appropriate notice to the class as required by 
the Agreement c >f Parti es 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Juan County 
M OCT 3 0 1996 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
DBVTY 
3. The Defendant Utah Judicial Council, its agents, officers, 
successors and all persons acting in concert or participating with 
it, are hereby ordered to comply with the provisions of the 
Agreement of Parties. 
4. Defendants Lyle R« Anderson, Bruce K. Halliday, and Bryce 
K. Bryner are hereby dismissed from this action, with prejudice. 
5. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to Paragraph Thirteen of the Agreement of Parties. 
Dated: /^Al/^ 
red As Form: 
Ptr Swenson 
Jensie L. Anderson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Ellen Haycock I * 
David C. Wright / 
Attorneys For Defendant 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit 3, Ruling 
SEVFNTH D l S ^ C r CC^PT 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AlfflM?0Rp r g _ r ?G»? 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH CLERK nF uE cOL °-
BY _ „ - ~ -
LOREN CRANK, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
RULING ON ATTORNEYS FEES 
vs. 
Civil No. 9307-26 
UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 
Defendant. 
The Supreme Court of Utah remanded this case on the issue of Crank's claim for attorneys 
fees under 42 U.S.C., section 1988, and Judge Anderson's claim for attorney fees under subparts 
(2) and (3) of Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b). 
The Court will first deal with the issue of Crank's claim for attorneys fees. It must be kept 
in mind that Crank lost on appeal on his attempt to have Judge Lyle R. Anderson found in 
contempt of court. This was a major thrust of his supplemental proceedings. The Court will, 
however, only deal with the issue of Crank's attorneys fees asserted against the Utah Judidal 
Council. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"Crank asserts that he is entitled to attorney fees under 42 U.S.C., Section 
1988(b), which provides, in pertinent part, that 'in any action or proceeding to 
enforce a provision of section [ ] . . . 1983 ... of this title, the court, in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's 
fee as part of the costs....' Crank argues the district court erred in holding he was 
not a prevailing party under this standard and in refusing to award him attorney 
fees...." 
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The Court then reviewed Arvinger v. Mayor of Baltimore, 31F .3d 196,200-02 (4th Cir. 
1994) and quoted the test as follows: 
w
...When plaintiffs are forced to litigate to pres«i^ the relief originally 
obtained,1 and where the issues pertaining to both actions are 'inextricably 
intermingled,' the plaintiffmay be treated as a prevailing party. Id at 202. Crank's 
motion facially meets this test." 
"Whether the motion to enforce the Agreonent qualifies Crank for prwailing 
party status under section 19S8 presents a separate question, however, to which we 
now turn. In Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), the United States Supreme 
Court addressed the question of the standards applicable to an award of attorney 
fees under section 1988. The Farrar Court prescribed as follows the standard for 
determining prevailing party status: 
To qualify as a prevailing party? a civil rights plaintiff must 
obtain at least some reKefon the merits of his claim. The plaintiff 
must obtain an enforceable judgement against the defendant from 
whom fees are sought... or comparable rdiefthrough a consent 
decree or settlement... Whatever relief the plaintiff secures 
must directly benefit him at the time of the judgement or 
settlement... In short, a plaintiff "prevails" when actual relief 
on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship 
between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a 
way that directly benefits the plaintiff/ 
Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-12 (citation omitted.) 
Ill this case, it is not clear whether the district court considered this standard." 
CRANK v. UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 20 P.3d 316-318 (Utah 2001) 
The trial court found that a baric question was whether or ncrt supplemental proceedings 
were necessary. The Agreement was filed on May 13,1996 and the order to show cause was 
filed September 3,1997 (16 months). Judge David E. Roth tried the issues on supplemental 
proceedings, and, among other rulings, made the following findings and rulings on December 11, 
1998: 
"The first thing I would Hke to say is that in my opinion from what I 
have seen of this case and during these last two days, I believe that on both 
sides of this case the parties are properly motivated and well intentioned. Both 
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trying to solve a similar problem but doing it in different ways from different 
prospectives. And while I agree and disagree with both of you to some extent, 
I don't see any villains in this courtroom.... 
It is an agreed fact in this case that the Judicial Council did not meet the 
plan timely. The question is, were they justified in not meeting the plan timely. 
They have given reasons for their failure to comply.... 
I think it's commendable that they have tried to work with the Navajo 
Nation in solving this problem... I think it's a good thing for the Council to work 
with them in solving this problem and I find that that has led to some of the delays 
in coming into compliance with the agreement. 
Had the Council asked for an extension with that explanation, I very likely 
would have granted it. 
I understand that Counsel thought that by communicating with Mr. Swenson 
they were free to continue to work and try to solve this problem without reporting 
to fiie Court. Without submitting apian... 
I appreciate efforts to avoid litigation, but that doesn't mean that you can't 
get together and submit a stipulated request for an extension. I see no effort, there 
is no evidence that that was attempted." 
Judge Roth found both parties to be "properly motivated" and "well intentioned." He did 
not see "any villains" in the courtroom. He then said, "The question is, were they [the Council] 
justified in not meeting the plan timely.H He seemed to find that the Council was justified because 
he found it commendable that the Council was working with the Navajo Nation to solve the 
problem. He found that such work lias led to some of the delays in coming into compliance with 
the agreement11 He also stated he would probably have extended the time if the parties had asked 
for it. He was bothered that the parties hadn't got together and stipulated to a request for an 
extension. He said, "I see no effort, there is no evidence that that was attempted." The 
Agreement itself anticipated that an "extension of time in which to bring the jury lists into 
compliance" might be needed. See paragraph 4.a. The same paragraph of the Agreement 
provided that "Prior to resorting to further litigation, the parties shall engage in reasonable 
discussions to resolve their differences informally." The parties exchanged letters but did not 
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"engage in reasonable discussions to resolve their differences." Both parties were in default in this 
provision of the Agreement. 
What did Crank accomplish by his motion for supplemental proceedings? Was he a 
"prevailing party" under section 1988? Did he "obtain some relief on the merits of his claim?1* 
This Court's task on remand is to determine whether, based on the facts and the Farrar standard, 
Crank qualifies as a prevailing party." This Court does not believe he qualifies as a pre vailing 
party. 
The Council filed a "Response Brief on Remand" dated December 17,2001. This Court is 
persuaded by the facts, arguments and conclusions contained therein and adopts them as part of 
the ruling herein. Many quotes from that brief follow without credit being given to the writer of 
the brief for them. 
The Council determined to obtain the best possible source list of Native Americans—a 
tribal enrollment list from the Navajo Nation itself which would then be merged with drivers 
license and voter lists to form the master jury list A usable list was finally obtained in time for the 
second half of 1998. The Council had, admittedly, not filed required status reports with the trial 
court. But it was undisputed that plaintiff was updated regularly and often. 
The Supreme Court held that the Council's stipulation that it had not filed its reports with 
the trial court did not confer prevailing parly status. The Court held that "because the stipulations 
did not create any legally-enforceable alteration in the Council's behavior toward Crank, the [trial] 
could not employ them as a predicate for a finding that Crank was a prevailing party" The 
Council was watting for the Navajo Nation to sign the Agreement before filing it. 
The trial court's ruling that the Council take action to increase the percentage of Native 
Americans on future inadequate questioimaire lists dc^ not confer prevailing party staJtus^  The 
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ruling did not benefit Crank and it did not alter the relationship already specified under the 
Agreement. The Council already had "reasonable discretion to undertake actions and implement 
policies which will comply with the goals [of the Agreement] and any plan filed pursuant to 
[paragraph 4 of the Agreement].*' The Council could also "submit new or supplemental plans... 
as may be needed to implement the purpose and goals of this agreement.** Agreement, paragraphs 
6-7 The Council was already obligated to "abide by all applicable laws, regulations, and 
constitutional provisions** in connection with its jury selection procedures. Agreement, paragraph 
8. Under the Agreement, the Council either had to implement measures to hit the target or seek 
relief from the trial court. Nothing in the trial court's order changes that The courts ruling, 
therefore, did not materially alter the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the 
defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff/9 
The evidence shows that the Council always intended to meet its obligations. The Council 
had already hired someone to obtain the Navajo list and to survey the residents along the Arizona 
border. Each time a new questionnaire list was to be drawn the Council believed it was about to 
get the list it needed to merge with the other source lists. So, there was no need for interim 
measures. The Council was already working diligently to satisfy the Agreement, so that Cranks 
motion did not alter the Council's behavior. The Council began working with the Navajo Nation 
in January of 1996, three months before the case settled. The relationship with the Navajo Nation 
is unprecedented. Judge Roth found the Council's eflFort commendable. He also found that "it 
was reasonable for [the Council] to focus its efforts on supplementing the mast list for San Juan 
County." 
The legal enforceability of the trial court's order does not alter the Council's relationship 
with, or confer a benefit on Crank. The Agreement was always legally enforceable. So a second 
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order with the same instructions changed nothing. The mere filing of the plan as ordered by the 
trial court did not confer a benefit on Crank. It was the plan's implementation that conferred the 
benefit, not the filing of it with the court. The Council's plan showed results during the second 
half of 1998, before the written plan was actually filed. The reforms were already underway and 
positive results were obvious at the time of trial and the plan had not been filed. The plan was the 
heart of the Agreement, however, the plan was bang implemented before it was filed and Crank 
knew what the plan was and what was being done to implement it 
The order to file the yearly reports already required under the Agreement did not confer a 
benefit on crank. Crank was well aware of the delay in getting the additional source list from the 
Navajo Nation and he knew the reason it was delayed. Crank was not better informed after the 
filing ofthe annual reports than before. Again, he knew the plan and he knew what was being 
done to implement it 
Crank objects to the arguments put forth by the Council in that brief Some of the Courts 
comments on them follow. 
Trial in this case was concluded on December 11,1998. The trial court required the 
Council to file the order, follow it up with annual compliance reports and take reasonable 
measures to correct future jury lists that may have deficient numbers of Native American jurors. 
The last provision is the only one that suggests anything new. Even this, however, is not really 
new. The Agreement provided in paragraph four (4) that, "Defendant shall formulate find 
implement a plan to assure that Seventh District Court jurors are chosen from sources reflective 
of a crosss section of the community of Jan Juan County/1 Necessarily implied within this torn of 
the Agreement is the requirement that defendant take reasonable measures to correct jury lists 
that may have deficient numbers of Native American jurors. The Court does not find tins to be 
9 0 6 ? 
"relief that was obtained through supplemental proceedings. Crank knew the Council's plan 
before filing supplemental proceedings and disagreed with it. He had an ongoing dispute with 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson. He wanted the trial court and Council to use supplemental sampling to 
create a jury list. Crank also knew the percentages of Native Americans on the jury lists being 
used prior to the time he filed supplemental proceedings.. Exhibit A of Agreement of the Parties 
contains a chart. Column DDL shows the percentage of Native Americans on the San Juan District 
Court Questionnaire Lists from 1990 thru the middle of 1996. 
1990 34.89 
1991 45.15 
1992 37.27 
1993 45.25 
1994 48.99 
1995 42.84 
1996 (1/2 yr) 34.00 (Up to filing of the Agreement) 
Corresponding figures since the filing of the Agreement follow: 
1996 45.8 (Last 1/2 of year) 
1997 43 2 Up to filing of supplemental proceedings) 
The 1990 census showed that 51.68 percent of San Juan County residents were Native 
Americans. The Agreement called for the Council to be within five points of the target or 46.68 
percent. The percentages support the fact that the Council was conscientiously attempting to 
comply with the Agreement at all times. It is also interesting to note that Hfor the years 1932 to 
1970, there were no Native Americans on any jury lists.ff 
The percentages since may be of interest but are not related to the decision. 
1998 45.45 
1999 49.70 
2000 48.30 
2063 
Crank did not obtain anything of substance more after filing supplemental proceedings 
than he already had. The fact that the plan and annual compliance reports were filed did not give 
him anything new. The only thing the Council was waiting for before film 
the Navajo Nation. Had Crank requested the filing without approval of the Nav^o Nation, it 
would have been forthcoming. 
Crank also argues that nThe Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff prevails when actual 
relief on the merits materially alters the legal relationship of the parties by modifying; the 
defendant's behavior in a way that direcdy benefits plaintiff" [Farrarcase] This Court does not 
differ with the legal principle involved birtdc^ differ with the apphcation that Crank urges. 
Crank states that, "The Council needed the prod ofa legal proceeding before taking acti This 
argument is a restatement of the prior argument concerning the fifing of the plan, etc., but based 
on a different legal theory. This Court is not persuaded by it 
Crank also urges an award of attorney fees based on "the public interest test." There is a 
public interest in having Native American jurors chosen in a fair and open jury selection process. 
Crank urges "this is a factor only in cases where it is alleged that plaintiffs success was limited in 
nature." There are two problems with the apphcation of to^ First, tins Court has 
found that Crank has not prevailed even "ma limited nature. It also appears to be a point which 
plaintiff did not preserve on appeal because he "did not adequately brief it in his motion for fees 
before the trial courtH Crank, 20 P.3d 319, n.17. Crank, however, insists that his claim is based 
solely on "the attorneys fee provisions of 42 U.S.C., section 1988. In either case, the Court rejects 
his arguments. 
Crank's request for costs and attorneys foes is denied. 
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The Court will now deal with the issue of Judge Anderson's claim for attorney fees under 
subparts (2) and (3) of Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b). 
The Utah Supreme Court held that the subparagraphs of Utah RXiv.P., Rule 11(b) 
".. . furnish a distinct basis for a finding of a violation of the rule [and] while 
bad faith may often be associated with violation of subparagraph (2) and (3)9 
such is not a necessary dement. A lawyer may bring frivolous or inadequately 
supported claims merely by failing to exercise the minimal required level of 
professional care and judgment." Crank v. Utah Judicial Council, 20 P. 3d 316 
Rule 11(b) provides as follows: 
"Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, 
other paper to the Court (whether by signing, filing, submitting or later 
advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best 
of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances, 
(1) it is not bang presented for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are 
warranted by existing law or by a nonfiivolous argument fofr the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; 
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary 
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support 
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence 
or, spedficall so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or 
belief 
Rule 11(c) provides as follows: 
Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, 
the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may . . . 
impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that 
have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation." 
At the beginning of his brief of December 14,2001, Eric P. Swenson states, "This Court 
should view the lengthy redtation of this case made in Judge Andersons brief with caution 
because the judge's role in this case is multi-faceted. He is involved as a litigant. He appeared as 
a defense witness for the Judicial Council. 1645, Page 225. He assists the Judicial Council in 
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implementing the Agreement and Consent Decree, e.g., R. 685-696. He also monitors the 
Council's compliance. R. 1621 (Addendum to Judicial Council Plan)." 
The Court is asked to use caution in in reviewing Judge Anderson's brief because he is a 
"litigant" Judge Anderson is a litigant in much the same way that Mr. Swenson is a litigant. 
Neither are really parties to the action. There was an attempt by Mr. Swenson to have Judge 
Anderson found in contempt and there is an attempt by Judge Anderson to have Mr Swenson 
sanctioned. 
This Court finds the following to be facts. Judge Anderson was dismissed with prejudice 
as a party to the lawsuh on October 27, 1996. He was not a party to the Agreement between 
Crank and the Council which had been signed about March of 1996. The Agreement required the 
Council to adopt a plan that would, by January 31,1997, provide jury questionnaire lists. On July 
18,1997, Mr. Swenson, acting for a criminal defendant not a party to this proceeding, challei^ed 
the composition of the questionnaire lists for the second half of 1997. Judge Anderson found that 
the 44.6% of the potential jurors were American Indians. He further found that the disparity of 
7.08% was not of constitutional dimension and denied the motion. On September 3,1997, Crank 
filed a motion to enforce the consent decree. Judge Anderson was included in the motion. Mr. 
Swenson suggested that, "The Court should consider whether Judge Anderson should be jailed 
for what can only be described as flagrantly racist conduct" Judge Anderson was never made a 
party to these supplemental proceedings. The motion added Judge Anderson to the case caption 
designating him as a "contemnor." One of the reasons Mr. Swenson referred to Judge Anderson's 
conduct as "flagrantly racist" was because Judge Anderson had ruled against him in the July 18, 
1997 case. Judge Anderson filed a motion to strike which was heard on August 14,1998. The 
trial judge granted the motion to strike Judge Anderson In doing so he said, "I find that Judge 
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Anderson has no affirmative duty that arises out of this Agreement. I also find that he could only 
be in contempt of this Court under the Agreement if he did something to frustrate the Council's 
efforts to comply with the Agreement. I find no evidence of that.... Quite frankly, I don't think it's 
even a close call to grant the Motion to Strike.w This Court also has reviewed the files and 
records and finds no action on the part of Judge Anderson which would indicate wrongdoing of 
any kind. After the trial court granted Judge Anderson's motion to strike, Crank abandoned his 
claim to find the Council in contempt of court. A trial was held on the other issues on December 
10-11,1998. Crank appealed the rulings of the trial court denying his request for attorney fees 
against the Council and the motion to strike Judge Anderson and the refusal to find him in 
contempt of court. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the motion to strike Judge Anderson and 
the refusal to hold him in contempt of court. 
Mr Swenson violated Rule 1 l(bXl). He was motivated in part by the rulings Judge 
Anderson made against him in the case tried on July 17,1997. This is when he describes Judge 
Anderson's conduct as "flagrantly racist.M This does not become apparent until August 14,1998, 
when the trial court ruled against him, yet he continued to pursue contempt against Judge 
Anderson. The purpose to harrass and embarrass then becomes apparent. 
Mr. Swenson violated Rule 1 l(bX2). He never argued that the court should extend, 
modify or reverse the law or establish new law. He contended that the existing law warranted the 
relief he sought. The Agreement imposed no affirmative duty on Judge Anderson to construct an 
appropriate master jury list. The Council was obligated to construct the list. Judge Anderson was 
bound to use the list. Judge Anderson was not a party to this action and Mr. Swenson took no 
action to make him a party. All action against Judge Anderson should have been abandoned after 
the August 14,1998, hearing wherein the trial court granted Judge Anderson's motion to strike. 
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At that time it was clear that Judge Anderson was not "flagrantly racist/1 was not a party to the 
Agreement and had no duty with respect to constracting the master jury list. If anyone should 
have been found in contempt of court it should have been someone working for the Council. 
Even this was not warranted because the Council had been acting in good faith throughout the 
proceedings. Mr. Swenson continued, however, to assort that Judge Anderson had an obligation 
to enforce the Agreement. 
Mr. Swenson violated Rule 1 l(bX3). This paragraph requires counsel to certify that his 
allegations and contentions are supported by evidence. It was clearn that Judge Anderson was 
not a party to the Agreement No sworn facts indicated that Judge Anderson had violated the 
Agreement or had made an attempt to interfere with its implementation. The Supreme Court 
noted that, "there are no concrete factual 
any actions that could be remotely continued as hampering the Council's efforts." 
The Court finds that the attorneys fees outlined by counsel for Judge Anderson to be 
reasonable in the amount of $5,931.24 for pre-appeal work and $11,402.90 for appeal and 
post-appeal work, or, a total attorneys fees of $17,255.00 as of November 16,2001. The Court 
also finds them to be necessary. 
The Court finds that counsel for the Plaintiffhas violated Rule 11(b), subparts (1), (2) and 
(3) and should be sanctioned therefor The Court is aware of the many ways there are to sanction 
a lawyer, but in this case the most effective method is the pocketbook. As a sanction, Eric P. 
Swenson is ordered to pay to Anderson & Anderson, PC. one-half of Judge Lyle R. Anderson's 
attorneys feesfor appeal and post-appeal work in the amount of $5,701,45. The sanction 
imposed is not based upon some formula but is the judgement of the Court that it is reasonable. It 
is meant as a sanction and the feet that Judge Anderson is not reimbursed for aU of his attorneys 
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fees is not a consideration. It was limited to the appeal and thereafter because the trial court 
found both parties to be "well-motivated" and "well intentioned" at the trial on December 11, 
1998. 
This Court finds that the ACLU played a relatively small part in the supplemental 
proceedings. Their counsel should not be sanctioned. 
In summary, Crank is denied attorney fees from the Utah Judicial Council. Judge Lyle R. 
Anderson is granted attorneys fees against Eric P. Swenson in the amount of $5,701.45. 
Counsel for the Utah Judicial Council is directed to draw a formal less wordy judgment. 
Dated this 6th day of Fe 
// 
iRNAfet, SeftbVJudge / 
I certify that on the 6th da^^^^Bja^% 2002,1 caused to be served via the U. S. Mail a 
copy of the foregoing to: 
Eric P. Swenson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 58798 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158 
David C. Wright 
White &Mabey,LJLC 
265 East 100 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Daniel G. Anderson 
Anderson & Anderson, P.C. 
81 East 100 South 
Monticeflo, Utah 84535 
ADDENDUM 
Exhibit 4, Rule 11 
Rule 11 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 36 
lines and signatures in permanent black or the court may relieve parties of the obligation 
blue ink. to comply with the rule or any part of it. 
Paragraph (f). The changes in this paragraph Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
make it clear that the clerk must accept all ment added the last sentence in Subdivision 
papers for filing, even though they may violate (a). 
the rule, but the clerk may require counsel to The 2000 amendment inserted "(and commis-
substitute conforming for nonconforming pa- sioner if applicable)" after "judge* near the end 
pers. The clerk is given discretion to waive of the first sentence in Subdivision (a), 
requirements of the rule for parties who are not Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to (c) 
represented by counsel; for good cause shown, of this rule are similar to Rule 10, F.R.C.R 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Exhibits. exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose 
—Use as pleadings. of supplying necessary material averments nor 
Cited. can die content of the exhibit be taken as part 
of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard 
E x h l b l t s
- v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). 
—Use as pleadings. Cited in State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646 
While an exhibit may be considered as a part
 p o , . . . . % ^ 9 >
 J
' 
of a pleading to clarify or explain the same, an *M u ' l u t a n l sww;* 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am, Jar, 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading AJLR. — Propriety of attaching photographs 
§§ 23 to 56, 69, 117. to a pleading, 33 AX.R.3d 322. 
C.J.S. — 71 C.JJS. Pleading §§ 5,9,63 to 98, Propriety and effect of use of fictitious name 
371 to 375, 418. of plaintiff in federal court, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 369. 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; 
representations to court; sanctions. 
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, 
if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each 
paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number, if any. Except 
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be 
verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken 
unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the 
attention of the attorney or party. 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or 
other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later 
advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of 
the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or 
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted 
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, 
or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; 
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support 
or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if 
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or 
belief. 
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the 
court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject 
to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the 
attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are 
responsible for the violation. 
(1) How initiated. 
(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made 
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separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific 
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 
5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days 
after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), 
the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not 
withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to 
Hie parly prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees 
incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate circumstances, 
a law firm may be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its 
partners, members, and employees. 
(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order 
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and 
directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated 
subdivision (b) with respect thereto. 
(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this 
rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or 
comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in 
subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives 
of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on 
motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to 
the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses 
incurred as a direct result of the violation. 
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for 
a violation of subdivision (bX2). 
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless 
the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or 
settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose 
attorneys are, to be sanctioned. 
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct 
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the 
sanction imposed. 
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do 
not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and 
motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4,1985; April 1,1997.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1997 turns committed by its partners, members, and 
amendments conform state Rule 11 with fed- employees." Under the state rule, joint respon-
eral Rule 11. One difference between the roles sibility is not presumed, and the judge may 
concerns holding a law firm jointly responsible impose joint responsibility in appropriate or-
for violations by a member of the firm. Federal cumstances* What constitutes appropriate or-
Rule IKcXIXA) states: "Absent exceptional cir- cumstances is left to the discretion of the judge, 
cumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly hut might include: repeated violations, espe-
responsible for violations committed by its daily after earlier sanctions; firm-wide 
partners, associates, and employees." Under sanctionable practices; or a sanctionable prac-
the federal rule, joint responsibility is pre- tice approved by a supervising attorney and 
sumed unless the judge determines not to im- committed by a subordinate, 
pose joint responsibility. State Rule IKcXIXA) Compfler'a Notes. — This rule is substan-
provides: «ln appropriate anmmstances, a law ^ ^ ^
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firm may be held jointly responsible for viola-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Adoption proceeding. Sanctions not warranted. 
Amendment of complaint. Sanctions warranted. 
Amount of sanctions. violation. 
Appeals. —Question of law. 
Due process. —Sanctions. 
Imposition of sanctions. Attorney fees. 
Nature of duty imposed. —Standard. 
Reasonable inquiry. Cited. 
